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Abstract

Usefulness of Audit-firm Transparency Disclosures

Jooanne Choi

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Dr. Gopal V. Krishnan
Trustee Professor of Accountancy
Department of Accountancy
Bentley University

South Korea is one of the first countries to enact audit transparency disclosure, requiring public
accounting firms to file an annual report containing information on audit production, governance,
operations, on-going litigations, and regulatory inspection results. In this dissertation, I make use
of this rich information setting to address issues concerning audit quality management systems,
audit-firm governance, and resource allocation in audit productions.
Motivated by the recent call from the PCAOB (Public Companies Accounting Oversight
Board) for better understanding of audit-firm quality control system, the first chapter (sole-authored)
examines the determinants of and return on firm-level investment in quality management. I find
that investment in human resources dedicated to quality management is positively related to the
proportion of partners who are responsible for managing quality control systems and the hours
invested in training of auditors during the fiscal year, and that audit-firm size, economic interest in
assurance business and training of novice auditors are positively associated with investment in
quality management.
In the second chapter, coauthored with Gopal Krishnan, I investigate whether and how the
timing of engagement quality review is associated with audit quality. Using the percentage of
review efforts spent in interim review relative to the percentage of engagement-team efforts spent
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in interim audit, I find that an earlier involvement of engagement quality review is positively
associated with engagement-team effort, and shorter audit reporting lag.
In the last chapter, coauthored with Gopal Krishnan, I examine the audit production
implications of two audit-firm governance characteristics: the degree of shirking incentive among
partners, measured by disparity in equity holdings of partners and delegation of control from nonmanaging partners to managing partners. I find that both equity disparity and control-ownership
wedge are positively associated with total audit hours and partner involvement in audit engagement,
and that while the equity disparity and control-ownership wedge are both positively associated with
client retention, the equity disparity is negatively associated with client recruitment. My findings
suggest that audit-firm governance attributes are important determinants of resource allocations in
audit production and, that transparency on audit-firm governance can be informative to existing
and new clients.
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CHAPTER ONE
Audit-firm Attributes and Investments in Quality Management Personnel:
An Empirical Analysis
Jooanne Choi

Abstract
Quality control system in public accounting ensures compliance with regulations and
standards for consistent quality of services rendered by firms. Motivated by the call from
the PCAOB for better understanding of audit-firm quality control system, I study the
implementations of audit-firm quality control system, using data from South Korea where
audit-firm transparency report has been disclosed for decades. I find that investment in
human resources dedicated to quality management is positively related to the proportion of
partners who are responsible for managing quality control systems and the hours invested
in training of auditors during the fiscal year. I also find that audit-firm size, economic
interest in assurance business and training of novice auditors are positively associated with
investment in quality management. Further, hiring of professionals and employee training
hours are negatively associated with engagement quality review efforts, suggesting payoff
from investment in quality management system. I contribute to the literature on audit
quality control by identifying audit-firm attributes and circumstances in which investment
in quality management are more prominent. My findings are potentially useful to audit
regulators in developing guidance for audit quality control systems.
Keywords: Quality control; audit investment; audit-firm transparency; engagement review
effort; audit-firm governance
1

I. INTRODUCTION
“Effective QC systems [within an audit firm] are crucial for consistent high-quality audits
and other engagements under PCAOB standards”
– PCAOB Concept Release No.2019-003
William D. Duhnke, a former Chairman of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) remarked that, “Strong systems of quality control provide the
foundation for audit firms to execute consistent, high-quality audits in accordance with
PCAOB standards. When firms effectively design and operate their quality control systems,
those systems promote more consistent compliance with our standards and thereby benefit
investors” (Duhnke 2019). The system of quality management 1 is a process to provide
auditors with reasonable assurance that the audit is conducted in compliance with
applicable regulatory and professional standards and the audit report issued is based on
professional judgements and appropriate audit procedures. 2 Auditors recognize the
importance of firm-level quality management and have been improving the quality
management system to enhance audit quality (Deloitte 2020; EY 2020a; Grant Thornton
2020; PwC 2020; KPMG 2021). The PCAOB has also acknowledged the importance of
quality control systems and has mandated evaluation and assessment of the system. 3 The
PCAOB Rule 4001 regarding regular inspection of audit firms specify that, “inspection

I use “quality management” interchangeably with “quality control” throughout this paper.
The PCAOB’s interim standard on quality control (QC 20) states that “[the] system of quality control is
broadly defined as a process to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that its personnel comply with
applicable professional standards and the firm's standards of quality.”
3
In 2017, PCAOB announced $1.5 million civil penalty and censures against Grant Thornton for violations
of the PCAOB quality control standard in connection with assignment and monitoring of engagement
partners on public audit engagement performed in 2013 and for audit failures; Grant Thornton was aware
that two engagement partners did not properly perform audits in prior years yet continued to assign them as
engagement partners without sufficient support or monitoring. James R. Doty, a former Chairman of the
PCAOB pointed out that “when quality controls concerning personnel assignment and oversight fail, serious
violations of auditing standards can result, as they did here, to the detriment of investors.” (PCAOB 2017).
1
2
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procedures must include … those set forth in Section 104(d)(1) and (2) of the SarbanesOxley Act and such other tests of … quality control procedures of the firm.” 4
Despite the importance of quality control system in public accounting firms, there
is paucity of empirical evidence on whether and how audit-firm attributes are associated
with investment in human resources for the design, implementation, and operation of the
quality management system. I attempt to bridge this gap in the literature by exploring
determinants of investment in quality control system5, and examining whether and how the
investment in quality control system is associated with firm-level audit quality. I gather
data on investment in quality control system from audit-firm transparency reports of public
accounting firms in South Korea, where various audit transparency disclosures have been
mandated for years. 6 I also collect data on audit firm attributes, including audit-firm
governance and leadership in quality management. Specifically, I measure investment in
quality control system as the weighted number of professionals dedicated for the system of
quality control, the number of other professional experts directly hired by the firm, and the
number of hours invested in training of CPAs during the fiscal year. In this study, I find
that assignment of supervisory responsibilities to a partner, firm size (based on membership
in larger professional network and total revenue generation), greater economic interest in

Section 104(d) specifies regulatory inspection on audit firms, Sec. 104(d)(1) requires that the PCAOB
“inspect and review selected audit and review engagements of the firm (which may include audit
engagements that are the subject of ongoing litigation or other controversy between the firm and one or more
third parties), performed at various offices and by various associated persons of the firm, as selected by the
Board” and Sec. 104(d)(2) requires the board to “evaluate the sufficiency of the quality control system of the
firm, and the manner of the documentation and communication of that system by the firm” on a regular basis.
5
While there is some prior research on elements of an audit-firm’s system of quality management, such as
client acceptance decisions and engagement quality review (Bedard et al. 2008; Emby and Favere-Marchesi
2010; Bik and Hooghiemstra 2018 and more), my study differs from prior research by focusing on which
audit-firm attributes are associated with the design, implementation and operation of the quality management
systems.
6
Audit-firm transparency reports generally describe information about drivers of audit quality, including firm
governance, professional resources, risk management and the system of quality management and the format
and the depth of contents vary across reports issued by firms.
4

3

assurance business for revenue generation, and the institutional role as a training center for
new professionals in the industry are positively associated with the number of professionals
and hours spent in training of auditors at audit firms. I also find that the direct hiring of
other licensed professionals is mostly associated with the economies of scale at audit firms.
These findings are potentially relevant to the PCAOB and other audit regulators.
The current version of the PCAOB’s interim quality control standards was adopted in 2003,
and it includes those originally developed by the U.S. Auditing Standards Board and certain
AICPA SEC Practice Section’s membership requirements as of April 2003. The PCAOB
is currently finalizing the standards on quality control, and the board has proposed over 50
questions seeking comments regarding the revision of the PCAOB quality control
standards, for example, on firm governance on the system of quality control, risk
assessment process integrated in the system, relevant ethical requirements, client
management, engagement performance and resource management, monitoring,
communication and more (PCAOB 2019-003). James G. Kaiser, a PCAOB board member
states, “scalability (of standards) will allow a firm to tailor its quality control system based
on its size, complexity and nature of the audits it performs” (Kaiser 2019). I believe that
my findings will be useful to the PCAOB in seeking answers to questions proposed in the
concept release, such as:
• “What factors should [PCAOB] consider when developing a future PCAOB QC
standard to ensure that its requirements are appropriately scalable?”
• “Would more clarity in the assignment of firm supervisory responsibilities enhance
supervision and positively affect QC systems and audit quality?”
• “Should a future PCAOB QC standard emphasize the importance of counterbalancing
commercial interest that may lead to underinvestment in the audit and assurance practice,
particularly in firms that also provide non-audit services?”, and
• “Should a future PCAOB QC standard require public disclosure by firms about their QC
systems?”

4

My study makes several contributions to the literature. First, to the literature on
audit-firm transparency reports, I contribute by providing evidence that information on
design and implementation of quality control system at audit firms would be informative
to the capital market about audit quality. Second, I also contribute to the literature on audit
production by providing evidence that investment in quality control system can lead to
resource allocation efficiency, as direct hiring of other professionals for internal sourcing
of specialists and training of professionals are negatively associated with average
engagement quality review efforts allocated for revision and evaluation of works of
engagement teams. Lastly, I contribute to the literature on audit quality control by
identifying audit-firm attributes and circumstances in which investment in quality
management are more prominent, and how the investment level is associated with review
effort efficiency.
Although I use data from the transparency disclosures reported by public
accounting firms in South Korea, findings would have implications to the PCAOB and
other audit regulators as this is one of the first study documenting market-level empirical
evidence. By exploring the system of quality management of all registered accounting
firms in South Korea and examining the associations between audit-firm attributes and
firm-level investment in the system of quality management, I also contribute to the nascent
literature on audit-firm system of quality control as well as the literature of auditor
transparency. Finally, my study is also expected to shed light on the usefulness of auditfirm transparency reporting. Although only several auditors voluntarily issue their
transparency report, unless they have a European client, findings of this study provide
guidance to capital market participants in understanding information content of the

5

transparency report, specifically on whether their design and operations of the system are
associated with effective quality management and would suggest superior audit quality.
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Institutional Background
South Korea adopted International Standards on Auditing (ISA) in 1999, before the
adoption of IFRS, to further enhance quality of public audits. In 2011, Korea adopted
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) followed by the adoption of the
clarified ISA (of 2009) in 2012. Along with the adoption of ISA in the late 90s, South
Korea was one of the early adopters when it comes to auditor transparency and public audit
accountability regulations. Public auditors were mandated to issue annual report on their
organizational structure and operations since 1997, where the report includes information
on audit-firm governance, internal operations, and financial statements.7
In March 2017, the Financial Services Commission (FSC) of South Korea
announced a one-year new business suspension on Anjin Deloitte, a Deloitte affiliate in
South Korea; Anjin Deloitte was banned from signing new service contract with public
companies and all financial institutions for a 12-month period. It was a regulatory penalty
after a huge accounting scandal of Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Company
(DSME) in 2016, an audit client of Anjin Deloitte from FY2010.8 Following the DSME
scandal, auditor transparency on the system of quality management was further expanded

See Appendix 2.B for a table of contents and selected items from FY2019 annual report of KPMG Korea.
Anjin Deloitte had internally identified underreporting of operating loss in audited financial statements of
FY2013 and FY2014 and requested DSME to restate the previously issued financial statements in 2016.
However, Anjin Deloitte initially issued clean opinions without any additional paragraphs on financial
statements of FY2013 and FY2014. The restatement request of 2016 was really a self-recognition of audit
failure. DSME reported 5.5 trillion KRW operating loss FY2015, while the internal inspection of Anjin
Deloitte identified that 2 trillion worth of the operating loss reported in FY2015 should have been recognized
early in FY2013 and FY2014.
7
8
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in 2017, requiring all auditors to specify details about the system of quality management
in the annual report and also to separately issue a transparency report annually, starting
FY2018.9 Later on, additional disclosure requirement on details of the system of quality
management became effective on reports issued after December 2019. Presently, audit
firms also disclose compensation information for the top five earning partners in annual
reports. South Korea mandated disclosure on audit production in November 2014, effective
on audit engagements of financial statements with year-end in December 2014 and
afterwards. Now, all audit reports on financial statements of public companies are
accompanied with an appendix summarizing audit production information such as the
number of CPAs involved, detailed hours spent by CPAs, and dates and locations of audit
fieldwork. Starting FY2018, public audit reports also include engagement partner name
and key audit matters identified by the auditor.
III. RELATED RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Academic research on auditor quality control initially focused on self-regulated
peer review system of auditors. While some studies provide empirical evidence that the
peer review system was effective in identifying significant audit-firm weaknesses (Wallace
1991; Felix and Prawitt 1993; Casterella et al. 2009), Fogarty (1996) point out that the peer
reviews focus mainly on quality-control processes of audit firms rather than actual audit
quality. Schneider and Ramsay (2000) show that the peer review system does not provide
economically significant information to the market, while participation in the peer review
The Act on External Audit of Stock Companies in October 2017 was amended after an accounting scandal
of Daewoo shipbuilding company in 2015 which called for better accountability of public audit as well as
auditor transparency. Previously regulations on auditor transparency were regarding audit engagements on
public companies. The amendment enhanced auditor accountability along with engagement production
accountability with expanded disclosure requirement improving auditor transparency. Starting FY2018,
limited liability companies are also subject to external audit and disclosure requirements if they meet external
audit and disclosure criteria applicable to non-listed companies.
9
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program is viewed favorably. Grumet (2005) points out that the peer review program lacks
independence among participants due to its “peer reviewing” nature. Though Schneider
and Ramsay (2000) report decrease in the average number of audit-firm weaknesses
identified in peer reports, Hilary and Lennox (2005) note that 95 percent of peer review
reports issued between 1997-2003 are unmodified and firms receive unmodified reports
without any letter of comments. More importantly, there is limited empirical research on
the effectiveness of audit-firms’ system of quality management. This is mainly because in
many countries, including the U.S., have not yet mandated auditor transparency reports
which would provide information on auditor’s quality management system. However, with
growing attention on audit quality and auditor quality control, public accounting firms have
continuously invested in internal system of quality management as well as to voluntarily
disclose and communicate how they maintain high quality service. Though the PCAOB
recognizes the importance of increased auditor transparency and accountability of public
audit for better market understanding of audit quality (PCAOB Release No.2015-008), we
do not know whether and which design and operational aspects of audit-firm quality control
system is informative about audit quality.
Auditor transparency reports generally describe auditor information regarding audit
quality, usually including firm governance, professional resources, risk management and
the system of quality management. Extant studies have already documented that firm-level
risk monitoring, knowledge sharing, and engagement quality review are firm-specific
characteristics determining audit quality (Epps and Messier, Jr. 2007; Bedard et al. 2008;
Duh et al. 2020), underlining the value of auditor transparency reports. Also, the
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB)’s International Standard
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on Quality Management include the transparency report disclosure requirement as an
example of regulatory response to accommodate auditor communication with others
external to the firm, as “information communication is pervasive to all components of the
system of quality management” (ISQM 1). However, only a handful of studies have
examined on auditor transparency using mandated transparency reports from public
auditors in a select few countries (Deumes et al. 2012; Fu et al. 2015; Kang et al. 2019;
Choi and Krishnan 2020). Deumes et al. (2012) explore information disclosed in
transparency reports of European auditors and document a weak association between audit
firms’ statement on the effectiveness of its internal quality control system and their audit
quality, however, they do not investigate implementation or effectiveness of firms’ system
of quality control described in the transparency reports disclosed. Currently, larger U.S.
auditors who also have clients listed in European capital markets are issuing annual
transparency reports in the U.S, as they are also registered with European regulators.
However, there is a paucity of research on auditor’s system of quality management. One
exception is Aobdia and Petacchi (2020) who use proprietary PCAOB data and explore
audit firms’ internal inspection program. They show that internal inspection programs
within the firms are predictable by engagement teams about when and which engagements
will be inspected using U.S. data; the study documents that engagement teams tend to
manage their efforts to meet internal inspection demands interactively. However, more
research is warranted to understand the design and operations of an effective quality control
system.
The recently finalized International Standard on Quality Management 1 (ISQM 1)
notes that the system of quality management “operates in a continual and iterative manner

9

and is responsive to changes in the nature and circumstances of the firm and its
engagements.” Unlike QC 20, it explicitly requires that “the firm to apply a risk-based
approach in designing, implementing and operating the components of the system of
quality management in an interconnected and coordinated manner such that the firm
proactively manages the quality of engagements performed by the firm.” ISQM 1 also
recognizes “the nature and circumstances of the firm” should be considered when
implementing the system of quality managements but does not explicitly allow firms to
implement a variant of quality management systems within the firm. QC 20 also states that
the system quality “depends heavily on the proficiency of its personnel.” However, the
assignment of quality control responsibility within the firm is not limited to equity-holding
partners within the firm, according to PCAOB standard. ISQM 1 also allows the
assignment of the ultimate responsibility and accountability for the system of quality
management, but only to the firm’s chief executive officer or the firm’s managing partner
(or equivalent) or, if appropriate, the firm’s managing board of partners (or equivalent),
while QC 20 states that the responsibility for the design and maintenance of the various
quality control policies and procedures should be assigned to an appropriate individual or
individuals in the firm, without limiting to partner(s) within the firm. Thus, it is a research
question whether specific assignment of equity partner(s) for responsibility of supervising
quality control system leads to more effective quality management of public accounting
firm.
Also, while the IAASB lists six elements of firms’ system of quality control, the
PCAOB only illustrates five elements of effective system of quality control for firm’s
accounting and auditing practice. The difference between the two approaches comes from
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whether the leadership and governance are identified as an element of the system. In a 2019
Concept release, the PCAOB acknowledge that it has long considered firm governance and
leadership, including the firm’s tone at the top, to be a crucial aspect of auditor system of
quality management. Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the AICPA10 has published an
exposure draft that proposes statements on quality management standards on a firm’s
system of quality management and engagement quality review on February 2021, in which
the ASB also recognizes “a need to improve firm governance and leadership and the culture
and tone at the top of the firm” to better maintain audit quality of firms (AICPA 2021).
Common elements of firms’ system of quality control between two standards are (a) ethical
requirements including independence, integrity and objectivity, (b) acceptance and
continuance of client relationships and engagements, (c) personnel management or human
resources management, including resource allocation in engagements (d) engagement
performance including consultation, resolution of differences of opinion and engagement
quality control review and (e) monitoring. ISQM 1 states that “the characteristics and
management style of leadership” should be assessed when implementing the system, while
the only mention of the management is in monitoring of the quality control system in
PCAOB standard on quality control (QC 30): “When monitoring, the effects of the firm's
management philosophy and the environment in which the firm practices and its clients
operate should be considered.”
I propose the following research questions to investigate whether and how the
governance and leadership characteristics are associated with the design and operations of
quality control system:

2020 version of AICPA standards on quality control list six elements of the system of quality control,
including leadership and firm governance.
10
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1A
Is the firm governance structure associated with the design and operations of
quality control system?
RESEARCH QUESTION 1B
Does clear assignment of equity partner(s) for responsibility of supervising quality
control system lead to greater investment for quality management?
On the other hand, the AICPA provides different practice aids on establishing and
maintaining a system of quality control for practitioners of difference sizes: one for sole
practitioners and one for small- and medium-sized firms. Public accounting firms with
different size and characteristics would inevitably design and operate the system of quality
management to better serve their internal needs depending on their business and
operational characteristics. For example, considering that larger public accounting firms
are also major trainings institutions11 of novice CPAs, firms with greater number of novice
professionals subject to greater supervision and training would design and operate their
quality management system to cater the demand, and public accounting firms mainly
operating in public audit business would be more interested in design and operation of a
quality control system compared to a public accounting firm whose major business is in
tax advisory. Also, regulatory pressure for high quality audit would encourage public
accounting firms to design and operate a quality control system that is effective in
supervising and monitoring firm-level service quality. This would be particularly important
for larger public accounting firms. Without doubt, an accounting scandal involving a large
public company would have a greater impact on the capital market than an accounting
scandal involving a small private company, and larger firms providing assurance on
financial reporting of major public companies in the capital market would be subject to

In South Korea, certified public accountants are only licensed after two years of field experience as a
practitioner.
11
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regulatory scrutiny and pressure. Also, larger public accounting firms often provide greater
number of assurances on financial reporting of public companies, and it is important for
regulators that their system of quality management is effective and strong. Accordingly, I
propose the following question to investigate what other firm characteristics such as size,
affiliation, and staffing are associated with design and operation of quality control system.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2
Besides governance and leadership, what other firm characteristics are
associated with the design and operation of quality control system?
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
To explore how audit firms design and operate their quality control system, I collect
and review audit-firm annual reports, including audit-firm transparency reports. In
voluntary transparency reports of large U.S. audit firms, for example, disclosure contents
on professional personnel within the firm vary dramatically. Some provide information on
the philosophy and standards of the firm in recruiting, training and retaining the personnel,
while other firms provide information on operations with numerical figures.12 For example,
while Big 4 audit firms emphasize training professionals on use of data analytics, there is
variation in terms of disclosure: while Deloitte and EY describes the number of training
hours the firm spent on professional during FY2020, KPMG and PwC describe the number
of audit professionals who have participated in the training during the year. In South Korea,
audit-firm transparency disclosure is regulated to incorporate consistency in contents
disclosed so that the disclosure delivers relevant information to the market with greater

For example, EY and BDO discloses number of professionals in different ranks (partners and managing
directors, senior managers and managers, and associated and staffs including interns) as well as ratios of
managing to non-managing professionals in elaboration of their professional resources. However, such
numerical figures are not provided in audit quality reports of KPMG or PwC in the U.S.
12

13

comparability among audit firms.13 In 2019, there are 185 registered public accounting
firms in South Korea, of which 4 firms had no audit clients and 52 firms had no public
audit clients.
My analyses are based on the following regression framework to analyze whether
and how audit-firm governance, leadership and other attributes are associated with design
and operations of quality control system:
Investment in Quality Management = f (Audit-firm attributes) + ε

(1)

To measure the design and operations of quality control system, I focus on humanresource investment in firm-level quality management. First, I measure the size of quality
control system as the number of professionals devoted to firm-level quality management
(QCSHR) by counting the weighted number of professionals and staffs in the quality
control system.14 This variable captures the extent of professional resources devoted to the
implementation and operation of firm-level quality control system. Because some
professionals and staffs work part-time, and some are not fully dedicated to their role in
quality management, I take a weighted number by multiplying 0.5 if one is part-time and
multiplying 0.5 if one is not fully dedicated. For example, if a professional is not fully
dedicated to quality management and only works part-time, the professional is counted as
0.25 person (1×0.5×0.5 = 0.25). Second, I measure the direct hiring of other experts by
counting the number of experts directly hired by the firm holding other professional
licenses. I take the natural logarithm of the number to construct the variable (EXPERT).15
An example table of contents for audit-firm annual report is provided as a supplement to the enforcement
decree, and all registered public accounting firms follow the exemplary format to disclose their annual reports
without an exception.
14
I use the natural logarithm of the number to address skewed distribution of the variable.
15
This is the best measure I can obtain about direct hiring of other professionals by public accounting firms.
It is possible that the measure is inflated as there could be an employee who holds multiple professional
licenses, and the person would be counted several times in the measure. However, I do not have data to adjust
13

14

This includes Certified Appraisers, Chartered Financial Analysts, lawyers, and foreign
CPAs. I do not include the number of Certified Tax Accountants (CTA) hired by the firm
because the scope of CTA license is within the scope of the CPA license in Korea. This
captures the extent that the firm is internally curating other expertise, where greater
knowledge spillover between other professionals and auditors is expected as opposed to if
the auditor uses a third-party specialist in audit production. Also, this measure would also
capture the potential and actual use of other professionals directly hired to train auditors on
non-accounting knowledge. Third, I directly measure the investment in training of CPAs.
I collect the number of hours invested in training of CPAs in auditing business segment
(TRAINING), and take the natural logarithm of the training hours spend in training to
address skewness in the distribution of variable. For the hours of training, if an audit firm
with 100 CPAs working in auditing segment sent 10 CPAs to a 20-hour lecture on updated
accounting standards (total of 200 hours), the firm would report an average 2 hours of
training spent to train their auditors in the report (total of 200 hours / 100 CPAs = 2 hours
per CPA on average). Therefore, I multiply the average training hours spent with the total
number of CPAs working in the auditing segment of the firm to measure for the total
number of hours invested in training of auditors working for the firm.
Measuring Audit-Firm Governance and Leadership in Quality Management
Following Choi and Krishnan (2020), I measure the extent of managerial delegation
and disparity in equity holdings among partners. Equity disparity is measured as the range
of equity ownership holdings among partners (EQDISP). Unfortunately, the ownership
holdings of managing partners are not identifiable in audit-firm annual reports of FY2019,

for such multiple count.
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and I am not able to measure the control-ownership wedge for audit firms in the sample
year. Instead, I measure the extent of managerial delegation by counting the number of
equity partners not involved in the management and dividing it by the total number of
equity partners of the firm (DELEGATION).16 To investigate whether and how the extent
of equity partner assignment for responsibility of supervising quality control system is
associated with design and operation of firm-level quality control, I measure how many
equity partners are assigned for supervision responsibility of quality management, scaled
by the total number of equity partners of the firm (LEADERSHIP).
Measuring other Audit-firm Attributes
I measure audit-firm size as the natural logarithm number of total revenue firms
(SIZE). Also, instead of controlling for the firm-level economies of scale with a
dichotomous variable indicating membership in Big N network, I create a continuous
variable to measure the size of professional network with the number of countries that the
affiliated network has a member firm operating in (NETWORK). For local firms without
any membership in a professional network, the variable (NETWORK) would be 0. To
measure the importance of audit business to firms, I measure the percentage sales generated
from providing service to audit clients (AUDITREV). Also, as larger firms also function as
training institutions in the industry, I measure the social role of the firm in training of
novice CPAs in the industry by measuring the percentage CPA employees still in their
apprenticeship as the number of apprentice CPAs divided by the number of total CPAs
working for the firm (APPRENTICE). 17 As quality management involves training of

This is equivalent to measuring control-ownership wedge with an assumption that the ownership holdings
are even among all equity partners.
17
In Korea, CPAs are required to have a minimum two years of experience to be licensed as an independent
CPA. Therefore, novice CPAs with less than two years of experience are separately classified from
16
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professionals, I believe this would be an important firm characteristic associated with firmlevel investment in quality management.
Model Specification
I regress the above-mentioned audit-firm attributes to explain the level of three
measures of firm-level investment in human resources for quality management:
QCSHR/ EXPERT/TRAINING = b0 + b1DELEGATION + b2EQDISP
+b3LEADERSHIP+ b4BIG + b5SIZE+ b6NETWORK
+ b7AUDREV + b8APPRENTICE + e
(2)
where OCSHR is the weighted number of professionals and staffs involved in quality
management scaled by the total number of employees; EXPERT is a natural logarithm of
the number of employees holding other professional license, and TRAINING is the natural
logarithm of the number of hours invested in training of CPAs in auditing business segment.
Audit-firm attributes related to firm governance and leadership relate to RQ1.
DELEGATION and EQDISP measure managerial delegation and equity-holding disparity
among partners, LEADERSHIP captures the number of equity partners assigned for
supervision and operations of quality management scaled by the total number of partners.
To examine RQ2, I include audit-firm size (SIZE), size of professional network
(NETWORK), and the importance of audit business to the firm proxied with the percentage
revenue generated from providing audit services to clients (AUDREV), and the percentage
CPAs still in their apprenticeship (APPRENTICE). I also include a dichotomous variable,
BIG, to control for the difference in the four largest auditors.
V. SAMPLE
My sample consists of registered public accounting firms in South Korea. There
were 185 public accounting firms serving the market in 2019 and 195 public accounting
experienced CPAs and reported in audit-firm annual reports.
17

firms serving the market in 2020. Registered public accounting firms also file annual
reports, including the financial statements presenting their financial positions and
operations, and the filing deadline is three months after the fiscal year-end. Accordingly,
most audit-firm annual reports are disclosed by the end of June. As the public disclosure
of details on firm-level quality management is effective from FY2019, I focus on a twoyear sample of annual reports of public accounting firms for fiscal years 2019 and 2020,
reported in the summer of 2020 and 2021, respectively. I collect the reports as of January
31, 2022, directly from the online capital market disclosure system in South Korea, the
Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (DART) system.
For 2019, fiscal year-ends in March, May, June and August and I do not find any
evidence that fiscal year-end is associated with firm-level characteristics. Out of 380 firmyear observations for the sample period, I collect necessary data for 370 firm-year
observations. As my study focuses on audit-firm attributes and their investment in quality
management, I exclude firm observations that did not provide any audit service. This leaves
370 firm-year observations for analyses, as described in Table 1.1. Public accounting firms
had 156 and 144 audit clients in 2019 and 2020, respectively. In both sample years, firms
have about 15 public audit clients on average. In 2019, 74 percent of audit firms (132 firms)
in the market had at least one public audit clients, but only about 46 percent (87 firms) had
at least one public audit client.
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Table 1.1 Sample Selection

Yearend

FY2019

FY2020

Total

March

May

June

Aug

March

May

June

Aug

174*

1

9

1

181

1

12

1

380

(less) firms with no audit client

(2)

-

-

(2)

-

-

-

(6)

(less) necessary information unobtainable

(3)

-

-

-

(2)

-

-

(1)

(4)

169

1

9

1

177

1

12

0

370

Number of registered public accounting firms

Sample observations

* Two firms changed their fiscal year end from March to June at the end of FY2019. They are not included in June count but in March count; the two companies
reported twice during the calendar year of 2020 for 12-month period of April 2019-March 2020 and 3-month period of April 2020-June 2020 because of the change
in fiscal yearend.
19
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VI. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of variables are summarized in Table 1.2. About 8.6 percent
of partners delegate their managerial decision to managing partners (DELEGATION); some
firms have all partners involved in managerial decision-making. The firm with greatest
managerial delegation has 18 partners, where only 6 partners are serving on the board as
directors (DELEGATIONmax = (18−6) / 18 = 0.667). Equity distribution ranges from an
even distribution (EQDISP = 0) to a single-person concentrated distribution (EQDISP >
0.99). There are three local firms where more than 99.9% of equity holdings are held by a
single partner in the sample. The mean LEADERSHIP suggests that an average audit firm
has 14.2 percent of partners working for quality management. The minimum value of
LEADERSHIP is zero, depicting local firms with no equity partner involvement in quality
management; in this case, usually senior manager(s) are names as the responsible personnel
for the quality management. However, the four largest audit firms, member firms of
Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC, have substantially greater involvement of non-partners in
the system. This is due to greater training activities administered by the quality control
system of larger firms with greater number of novice CPAs. Although untabulated, 33 firms
in FY2019 and 34 firms in FY2020 are member firms of a global professional network.
The average number of countries in which affiliate professional networks have their
member firms is 105 countries for the two sample years, where there are approximately
47,866 professionals in each professional network on average. According to the public
disclosures, Deloitte18, EY, KPMG and PwC had member firms in 150, 153, 147 and 157

Anjin Deloitte had originally joined the global network of Deloitte, Deloitte Tohmatsu Limited, in 2002.
However, Starting FY2020, the firm has changed its membership to a regional network, Deloitte Asia Pacific
18
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countries, respectively, in FY2019, with 299,000, 312,000, 183,270 and 276,005
professionals sharing the knowledge base in the network. During the sample years, an
average public accounting firm earned 26.6 percent of revenue from providing audit and
assurance service to clients (AUDREV). The minimum and median values of
APPRENTICE are both zero, suggesting that more than half of public accounting firms do
not serve as a training institution for novice CPAs and only operates with experienced
CPAs, professionals with at least two years of experience19. Though the sample mean of
APPRENTICE is 0.017, the average value of APPRENTICE among the four BigN member
firms is 0.1284, supporting the idea that large audit firms serve the industry as training
institutions of apprentice CPAs.
Turning to measures of quality management, the mean value of QCSHR is 0.041
suggesting that firms allocate about 4.1 percent of its manpower to quality management;
only 28 observations have QCSHR value greater than 0.1 suggesting that firms invest less
than 10 percent of employees in quality management of the firm. On average, audit firms
have 6.357 people working for quality management within the firm. There is one firm-year
observation where only a single part-time undedicated professional is responsible for the
quality management, which is reasonable if the firm has only one private audit client. On
average, audit firms have 19 other licensed professionals working for the firm, but about
36 percent (132 obs.) of sample observations exhibit that firms do not hire any other
professionals, excluding certified tax accountants. An average public accounting firm

Limited, resulting in a drop in the number of countries in which the member firms are operating in to 26
countries. However, it did not change the substance of the affiliation status and influence of the global
governance board on member firms.
19
In South Korea, two years of professional experience in public accounting is the minimum criteria to earn
license after passing the CPA exam.
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invested 3,674 hours in training of CPAs in auditing business segment, however, 13 firms
and 10 firms in FY2019 and FY2020, respectively, did not invest in training of auditors.
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Correlation coefficients between variables are summarized in Table 1.3. Three
variables are used to measure for the firm-level investment in human resources for quality
management, but the number of professionals devoted to quality control system (QCSHR)
is not significantly correlated with the other two measures. The number of other licensed
professionals directly hired by firms (EXPERTS) and the hours invested in training of
auditors during the fiscal year (TRAINING) are positively correlated (ρ = 0.619). Partner
assignment for supervision and operations of quality control system (LEADERSHIP) is
highly correlated (ρ = 0.712) with the number of professionals devoted to quality control
system (QCSHR), but other variables do not exhibit strong correlation coefficients with
QCSHR. The number of other licensed professionals directed hired by audit firms
(EXPERTS) is highly correlated with audit firm size (SIZE), and the size of affiliated
professional network (NETWORK) (ρ = 0.701 and ρ = 0.606), together suggesting that the
economies of scale would be the determinant of hiring other licensed professionals rather
than outsourcing them. The hours invested in training of auditors during the fiscal year
(TRAINING) is also highly correlated (ρ = 0.648) with audit firm size (SIZE).
Multivariate Analysis
Table 1.4 summarizes the results of model (2). Regarding RQ1a, I find that
the percentage partners delegating the management to the remaining subset of partners is
significantly associated with the number of professionals allocated to firm-level quality
management (βDELEGATION, QCSHR = 0.548, p-value < 0.05).
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Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics
(n = 370)
Audit-firm Attributes
Variable

Mean

SD

Minimum

DELEGATION

0.086

0.154

0

0.000

0.667

EQDISP

0.276

0.235

0

0.202

1.000*

LEADERSHIP

0.142

0.175

0

0.091

1

BIG

0.022

0.146

0

0

1

SIZE

22.831

1.038

NETWORK

0.821

1.770

0

0

5.124

AUDREV

0.266

0.123

0.001

0.254

0.631

APPRENTICE

0.017

0.040

0

0

0.214

20.197

Median

22.717

Maximum

27.361

Investment in Quality Management
Variable

Mean

SD

QCSHR

1.340

0.849

QCSHR2

0.041

WQCS

Median

Maximum

0.223

1.099

5.278

0.038

0.004

0.028

0.231

6.357

18.996

0.250

2

EXPERTS

1.217

1.337

0

1.099

RAWEXPT

18.592

94.461

0

2

TRAINING

5.598

2.121

0

5.485

RAWTRNG

3674

Minimum

20059

0

240

195
7.079
1186
12.329
226200

* Maximum value of EQDISP is 0.9999, but it is rounded up to 1.000 in the table. SD denotes standard
deviation of the variable. See Appendix 1.A for definitions of all variables.
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Table 1.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients
QCSHR

EXPERTS

EXPERTS

0.032

TRAINING

0.074

0.619***

-0.000

0.563***

BIG
EQDISP

0.139**

DELEGATION

0.062

LEADERSHIP

0.712***

-0.153**
0.269***
-0.091

TRAINING

BIG

EQDISP

DELEGATION LEADERSHIP

SIZE

NETWORK

(n = 370)
AUDREV

0.426***
-0.153**
0.270***
-0.054

-0.116
0.205***
-0.089*

-0.211***
0.104*

-0.148**
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SIZE

-0.092

0.701***

0.648***

0.588***

-0.307***

0.355***

-0.209***

NETWORK

-0.036

0.606***

0.538***

0.336***

-0.188***

0.311***

-0.174***

0.611***

-0.286***

0.291***

-0.004

0.381***

0.357***

0.157**

0.047

0.417***

0.337***

AUDREV

0.113*

0.319***

0.373***

0.081

APPRENTICE

0.196***

0.403***

0.414***

0.419***

0.009

*, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. See Appendix 1.A for definitions of all variables.
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0.267***

Table 1.4 Audit-firm Governance, Leadership, and Investment in Quality Management
(n = 370)

DELEGATION
EQDISP
LEADERSHIP
BIG
SIZE
NETWORK
AUDREV
APPRENTICE
constant

Adjusted R2

(1)

(2)

(3)

QCSHR

EXPERTS

TRAINING

0.548**
(2.37)
0.157*
(1.93)
1.696***
(10.19)
1.163***
(5.33)
0.438***
(13.63)
0.053***
(3.29)
1.086***
(5.89)
1.865***
(3.30)
-9.377***
(-12.90)

-0.057
(-0.17)
0.321*
(1.67)
0.390
(1.42)
2.195***
(7.17)
0.492***
(6.77)
0.212***
(5.88)
0.694
(1.46)
1.027
(0.66)
-10.585***
(-6.32)

0.794

0.581

0.200
(0.41)
0.466
(1.05)
0.814**
(2.32)
0.938**
(2.34)
0.872***
(7.26)
0.234***
(5.88)
2.030***
(2.75)
5.652***
(4.03)
-15.429***
(-5.68)
0.478

This table summarizes regression results for audit-firm governance, leadership in quality management and
other attributes on investment in quality management. First column presents regression estimates of the
percentage professionals working for quality management (QCSHR), the second column presents regression
estimates of the number of other licensed professional hired by audit firms (EXPERTS), and the third column
presents regression estimated of the number of hours spent in training of auditors (TRAINING). *, **, ***
denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, and numbers in parentheses are
test statistics. White (1980) robust standard errors are used to estimate the statistical significance levels. All
regressions report an average VIF less than 2, and individual VIFs of regressors are less than 2.5 for all
independent variables. See Appendix 1.A. for definitions of all variables
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However, I do not find any evidence that the managerial delegation is significantly
associated with the firm-level direct hiring of other licensed professionals (βDELEGATION,
EXPERTS

= - 0.057, p-value > 0.10), or the hours invested in training of CPAs in audit

business segment (βDELEGATION, TRAINING = 0.200, p-value > 0.10). I also find weak evidence
that firms with greater equity holding disparity among partners make greater investment in
human resources for quality management (βEQDISP, QCSHR = 0.157, βEQDISP, EXPERTS = 0.321;
p-value < 0.10 for both), consistent with the notion of the agency theory that firms would
be interested in monitoring and review of works done by their partners when partners have
conflicting incentives.
For RQ1b, I also find strong evidence that the extent of assignment of partner in
supervision and operations responsibility is positively associated with the number
professionals allocated to firm-level quality management (βLEADERSHIP, QCSHR = 1.696, pvalue < 0.01) and the hours invested in training of auditors (βLEADERSHIP, TRAINING = 0.814,
p-value < 0.05). The results are consistent with the notion that a clear assignment of partner
leadership in supervision of quality control system is critical in allocating and training
human resources for quality management. These results suggest that the regulatory
amendment requiring partner assignment in leadership of firm-level quality management
will encourage firms to enhance and strengthen their investment in human resources for
quality management.
For RQ2, exploring other audit-firm attributes for the investment in human
resources for quality management, I find that the firm size matters. Results show that the
estimated coefficients of the three variables measuring firm size in various perspectives are
all significant on all three measures of firm-level investment in human resources for quality
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management. Estimated coefficients for three variables measuring audit-firm size in
multiple perspectives (BIG, SIZE and NETWORK) are all positively significant (p-value <
0.01) on all three measures of human resource investment for quality management at audit
firms in column (1), (2), and (3) of Table 1.4. F-statistics show that the three variables are
jointly significant in all regressions as well. Also, the size-related variables are the only
variables significantly associated with the number of other licensed professionals directly
hired by firms, except for the equity disparity among partners (EQDISP). In other words,
the economies of scales may be the biggest determinants to direct hiring of other licensed
professionals for public accounting firms.
In addition to size, regression results in Table 1.4 show that the importance of
assurance business, measured with the percentage revenue generated from audit and
assurance business (AUREV), is positively associated with the number of professionals
devoted to firm-level quality management and the number of training hours invested during
the fiscal year (βAUDREV, QCSHR = 1.086, βAUDREV, TRAINING = 2.030). This is consistent with the
notion that quality management is of greater interest when it comes to audit quality, and
firms with greater economic interest in assurance business are making a greater investment
in human resources for quality management. Also, I find that firms serving as a training
institution in the industry, measured as the percentage employees with less than two years
of professional experience, tend to invest more in human resources for quality management,
by devoting greater the number of professionals in operations of quality control system
(βAPPRENTICE,

QCSHR

= 1.865) and spending much greater time in training of auditors

(βAPPRENTICE, TRAINING = 5.652). This is consistent with the notion that it requires much effort
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to train novice auditors, implement and operate a system to monitor and review the work
of inexperienced auditors to maintain adequate audit quality across the firm.
Alternative measures of investment in quality management
To test for robustness of results summarized in Table 1.4, I re-estimated regressions
with alternative measures of investment in quality management. As an alternative measure
of the number professionals devoted to quality management (QCSHR) surrogating the size
and overall investment in quality control system, I scaled the weighted number of
professionals devoted to operations of quality control system by the total number of
employees (QCSHR2). Regression results are summarized in column (1) of Table 1.5, and
the direction of estimated coefficients are generally consistent with the results reported in
column (1) of Table 1.4.
As alternative measures of the number of other licensed professionals hired
(EXPERTS), I scaled the number of other licensed professionals by the total number of
employees (EXPERTS2). Regression result is summarized in column (2) of Table 1.5, and
the direction of estimated coefficients are generally like the estimates in column (2) of
Table 1.4, except that the estimated coefficient of SIZE is no longer significant nor positive.
I also tested whether the direct hiring of other local licensed professionals (LOCALEXP)
and other foreign licensed professionals (FOREIGNEXP) exhibit similar associations.
Estimated coefficients are generally consistent in direction and significance with the main
regression result, except that I find a weak negative association between the managerial
delegation and the number of other local licensed professionals (βDELEGATION, LOCALEXP = 0.459), and a positive association between the percentage revenue generated from

28

providing assurance services and the number of other foreign licensed professionals hired
(βAUDREV, FOREIGNEXP = 0.804).
As an alternative measure to hours invested in training of auditors during the fiscal
year, I measure the average hours spent in training of auditors in three recent years. For
firms with less than three years of operations, TRAINING value is substituted instead; there
are 40 firm-year with less than three years of operations in this sample. Regression result
is summarized in column (5) of Table 1.5, and the result is consistent with the main result.
Subsample analyses without outliers
I also re-estimated regressions in Table 1.4 with a subsample after excluding
member firms of Big 4 networks, or the four largest audit firms in the market, and the four
smallest audit firms in each year, in terms of total revenue, to show that the findings are
robust to the effects of Big 4 auditors (n = 354). Estimated coefficients using the subsample
(untabulated) were consistent in both magnitudes and significance with those reported in
Table 1.4, except for the estimated coefficients of LEADERSHIP on EXPERT, which is
now positive and significance at 10% level.
It is also possible that the length of membership in the professional network has
varying influence on firm-level decision for investment in quality management, as it is
more about how long the firm has been a member of the professional network rather than
the size of the network that can impact on the design and implementation of quality control
system. I further collect data on when the firm has joined a professional network as a
member firm, measure the length of membership in years (LENGTH), and substituted
NETWORK variable in the regression model. Results (untabulated) are consistent in both
magnitude and significance levels with those reported in Table 1.4.
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Additional Analyses
I perform additional tests to examine which audit-firm characteristics are associated
with investment in quality management as well as whether and how the investment in
quality management is associated with audit quality. I test whether the size of quality
control system, the number of other licensed professionals hired, and training of CPAs
involved in audit productions are associated with efficiency of engagement quality review
efforts. If the investment has contributed to quality improvement at firm level, engagementteam level decisions in audit production would be superior and the reviewer would not
need to spend additional time reviewing the engagement. Also, if the investment is also
associated with the quality of engagement reviewers, the reviewer would be more timeefficient in reviewing the working papers of engagements.
I hand collected over 4,000 public audit engagements on financial statements
prepared at December yearend in FY2019 and FY2020, which is 76% of all public
companies in the two years. I find that audit firms with greater investment in hiring of other
licensed professionals and training of CPAs involved in audit engagements are associated
with efficiency in engagement quality review efforts. As presented in Table 1.6, I find that
firms with greater investment in hiring of other licensed professionals and training of CPAs
involved in audit engagements tend to spend less hours in review of audit engagements,
after controlling for client-characteristics and audit production characteristics.
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Table 1.5 Alternative Measures of Investment in Quality Management
(n = 370)

DELEGATION
EQDISP

(1)

(2)

QCSHR2

EXPERT2

-0.096

0.018

(-0.20)

(0.59)

0.413*
(1.68)

LEADERSHIP

SIZE

AUDREV
APPRENTICE
constant
Adjusted R2

(5)

LOCALEXP FOREIGNEXP TRAINING3YR
-0.459*
(-1.81)

0.010

0.329*

0.167

0.304

(0.56)

(0.64)

0.158

0.589
(1.35)

(1.88)

(1.00)

0.024

0.044

0.394

(1.08)

(0.23)

(1.59)

0.107***

3.220***

2.257***

(1.93)

(3.10)

(9.19)

(8.22)

(2.20)

0.945***

-0.008

0.211***

0.444***

0.914***

(2.82)

(7.72)

(8.08)

0.211***

0.221***

(6.82)

(5.79)

0.778**
0.726*

(7.51)
NETWORK

(4)

(0.56)

(2.17)
BIG

(3)

0.021

(-1.06)
0.011***

0.072**

(0.71)

(3.17)

(2.10)

2.775***

-0.014

0.659

(5.39)

(-0.24)

(1.42)

(2.02)

1.436

0.241

-0.068

1.268

(0.82)

(1.52)

(-0.06)

(0.94)

-4.703***

-9.691***

-11.164***

0.222

0.804**

0.975***
(2.87)
0.834**

1.899***
(2.61)
6.016***
(4.33)
-16.500***

(-3.83)

(1.19)

(-2.69)

(-7.43)

(-6.45)

0.478

0.099

0.442

0.665

0.500

This table summarizes regression results for audit-firm governance, leadership in quality management and
other attributes on alternative measures of investment in quality management. First column presents
regression coefficient estimates of QCSHR2, an alternative measure to the number of professionals working
for quality management scaled by total number of employees. The next column presents regression
coefficient estimates of EXPERT2, LOCALEXP, and FOREIGNEXP; the number of other licensed
professional hired by audit firms scaled by the total number of employees, and natural logarithms of the
number of other local licensed professionals and the number of other foreign licensed professionals directly
hired by the firm, respectively. The last column presents regression coefficient estimates of the average
number of hours spent in training of auditors during a fiscal year in recent three years (TRAINING3YR). *,
**, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, and numbers in
parentheses are test statistics. White (1980) robust standard errors are used to estimate the statistical
significance levels. All regressions report an average VIF less than 2, and individual VIFs of regressors are
less than 2.5 for all independent variables. See Appendix 1.A. for definitions of all variables.
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Table 1.6 Investment in Quality Management and Engagement Quality Review Efforts

QCSHR

(1)

(2)

EQREFFORT

EQREFFORT

-0.027***
(-3.56)

0.905***
(42.13)
0.000
(0.00)
0.301***
(49.99)
0.001
(1.14)
0.142***
(8.40)
0.161
(1.15)
0.129***
(5.21)
0.063***
(3.32)
-0.232***
(-6.17)
-4.981***
(-31.62)

0.995***
(30.78)
-0.010
(-0.13)
0.301***
(49.89)
0.001
(1.17)
0.147***
(8.65)
0.165
(1.18)
0.133***
(5.37)
0.062***
(3.26)
-0.229***
(-6.12)
-4.924***
(-30.99)

-0.115***
(-15.94)
1.230***
(43.27)
-0.265***
(-3.48)
0.305***
(52.49)
0.001
(0.83)
0.161***
(9.86)
0.168
(1.26)
0.137***
(5.72)
0.067***
(3.65)
-0.228***
(-6.22)
-4.047***
(-24.84)

0.691

0.689

0.712

TRAINING

PINV
CSIZE
MB
NEW
IPO
IMPAIR
LOSS
ROA
constant

Adjusted R2

EQREFFORT

-0.282
(-1.15)

EXPERTS

BIG

(n = 4,084)
(3)

This table summarizes regression for investment in quality management on engagement quality review
efforts in audit production, whether the model is specified as EQREFFORTij = f(QCSHRi or EXPERTSi or
TRAININGi) + g(Inherent riskj, control riskj, detection riskij) + ε. i denotes audit firm and j denotes client
engagement. Columns present regression estimates on a natural logarithm of engagement review efforts
(EQREFFORT). Sample consists of 4,084 public companies with December yearend in FY2019 and FY2020,
which is about 75% and 76% of December-yearend public companies listed in Korea Stock Exchange in
FY2019 and FY2020, respectively. *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively, and numbers in parentheses are test statistics. White (1980) robust standard errors are used to
estimate the statistical significance levels. Regressions reported in column (1)-(3) have model average VIFs
and individual VIFs of all regressors less than 2. See Appendix 1.A. for definitions of all variables.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Quality control system in public accounting ensures compliance with regulations
and standards for consistent quality of services rendered by firms. Despite the importance
of quality control system public accounting firms, little is known about what firm-level
attributes lead to investment for quality management in public accounting firms. In this
study, I explore which audit firm attributes are associated with investment in quality control
system, especially on investment in human resources for firm-level quality management.
Overall, I find that audit-firm governance and leadership characteristics are positively
associated with investment in human resources for quality management. Specifically, I find
robust evidence that leadership in quality control system is a critical determinant of
investment in human resources for firm-level quality management; having partners
assigned for the ultimate responsibility for quality management is significant for the
number of professionals devoted to operations of quality control system and hours invested
during the fiscal year in training of auditors. However, I do not find robust empirical
evidence that the governance and ownership characteristics are associated with investment
in human resources for firm-level quality management. I also find that the size of firm,
economic reliance on assurance business for revenue generation, and the percentage
apprentice auditors working for the firm are also significantly associated with the number
of professionals devoted to quality management and the number of hours invested in
training of auditors during a fiscal year.
I believe these findings provide useful insights to regulators, especially the PCAOB,
about factors to consider when developing and updating quality control standards for
auditing industry. I believe the importance of assigning partner-level responsibility on
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quality management for investment in human resources for quality management is
particularly meaningful, as public audit is a service rendered by professionals. While the
current version of PCAOB Quality Control Standard does not require the partner-level
assignment for the ultimate responsibility of firm-level quality management, my finding
suggest advocate the IASB’s Quality Management Standards and the revised new Quality
Control Standard that requires partner-level assignment for the ultimate responsibility of
quality management, as it will benefit the industry with clear guidance leading to greater
investment for quality management. Also, firm size in terms of its yearly revenue and
membership in professional network are significantly associated with investment in human
resources for quality management in all perspectives. These findings again address the
importance of scalability when applying the quality control standards, as firms with various
sizes have different tangent point of investment for quality management.
Though academics and practitioners have identified audit-firm quality control
system as an important mechanism in maintaining high audit quality, it is not clear how
much other market participants incorporate information on audit-firm quality control
system in evaluating audit quality. This study is conducted using the first two-year sample
of on sample of detailed disclosure on implementations and operations of quality control
system from public accounting firms in South Korea, and findings are much more
generalizable than empirical findings from a single-firm data. Future research can
potentially examine how much weight investors and other stakeholders put on the
information regarding audit-firm quality management in evaluating audited financial
statements.
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Appendix 1.A Variable definitions
Investment in Quality Management

WQCS

Weighted number of professionals devoted to operations of quality control
system; 0.5 weight is given to part-time professionals, and 0.5 weight is
given to professionals taking a dual role in quality management and
service rendering in other business segments.

QCSHR

A natural logarithm of the weighted number of professionals devoted to
operations of quality control system of audit firm + 1

QCSHR2

Percentage professionals working for the firm-level quality management,
measured as the weighted number of professionals devoted to operations
of quality control system divided by the total number of employees.

QCPRATIO

Percentage total compensation expense spent on professionals devoted to
operations of quality control system and firm-wide quality management;
QCPAY / Total compensation expense of the firm.

RAWEXPERTS

Number of other licensed professionals hired by audit firm, excluding the
number of certified tax accountants.

EXPERTS

A natural logarithm of the number of other licensed professionals hired by
audit firm + 1; ln(RAWEXPERTS+1).

EXPERTS2

Number of other licensed professionals hired by audit firm scaled by the
total number of employees; RAWEXPERTS / Total number of employees.

LOCALEXP

A natural logarithm of the number of other local licensed professionals
(lawyers, appraisers, actuaries, etc.) hired by audit firm + 1;
ln(RAWEXPERTS+1).

FOREIGNEXP

A natural logarithm of the number of other foreign licensed professionals
(e.g. AICPA, foreign lawyers, etc.) hired by audit firm + 1;
ln(RAWEXPERTS+1).

RAWTRAINING

Number of hours spent in training of employees, measured as the average
hours of training provided to an auditor multiplied by the number of CPAs
working in auditing segment.

TRAINING

A natural logarithm of number of hours spent in training of employees,
measured as a natural logarithm of training provided to an auditor
multiplied by the number of CPAs working in auditing segment + 1.
= ln(RAWTRAINING+1).

TRAINING3YR

A natural logarithm of the average number of hours spent in training of
employees in recent three years. If a firm has been operating for less than
three years, TRAINING value is substituted in this variable. There are 40
firm-year with less than three years of operations in this sample.
= ln((RAWTRAININGt + RAWTRAININGt-1 + RAWTRAININGt-2)/3).
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Audit-firm Attributes
DELEGATION

Percentage partners not involved in managerial decision-making.
= (Total number of partners – number of partners serving in the board)
Total number of partners.

EQDISP

Equity ownership disparity among partners as defined in Choi and
Krishnan (2020); range of ownership holdings among equity partners of
firm.

LEADERSHIP

Number of equity partners assigned for supervision and operations
responsibility of quality control system, scaled by the total number of
equity partners of the firm.

BIG

1 if the auditor is a member of Deloitte, EY, KPMG or PwC network.

SIZE

A natural logarithm number of total revenue firms

NETWORK

Size of affiliated network measured as a natural logarithm of the number
of countries in which the network has a member + 1.

AUDREV

Percentage revenue earned from providing external audit service; Total
audit revenue / Total revenue.

APPRENTICE

Percentage certified public accountants without independent CPA license;
Number of novice CPAs/ Total number of CPAs working for the firm.

Client-level variables
EQREFFORT

Engagement quality review efforts measured as a natural logarithm of
quality review efforts in hours spent +1; if no review efforts were exerted,
ln(0+1) would be zero.

PINV

Engagement partner involvement in audit, measured as engagement
partner efforts in hours divided by both auditor and other audit
participants’ efforts in hours.

CSIZE

Client size measured as a natural logarithm of total assets in 1000 KRW.

MB

Market to book ratio measured as calendar year average market
capitalization divided by book value.

NEW

IMPAIR

1 if there is a switch of the external auditor, 0 otherwise.
1 if the client firm is preparing IPO in the following fiscal year, 0
otherwise.
1 if the client equity capital is impaired, 0 otherwise.

LOSS

1 if the client reports net loss, 0 otherwise.

ROA

Return on assets as income before extraordinary items divided by total
assets.

IPO
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Appendix 1.B The table of contents from annual report of Samjong KPMG Korea for FY2019

Annual report (Cover page)
Management Certificate
I. Overview of the Firm
1. Financial Statements
a. Statement of Financial Positions
b. Statement of Operations
c. Statement of Cash Flows
d. Statement of Change in Equity
e. Footnotes
2. Supplement schedules
a. Loan statements (Source, monetary amount, maturity, interest rate)
b. List of investment in other companies
c. Debt guarantee status statement
3. Revenue per business segments
4. Purpose of the business
5. History of the firm
6. Change in equity
7. Affiliation with global network
8. Office locations
9. Registration status with foreign regulatory bodies
II. Summary of Business
1. Summary of business (List of services rendered)
2. Number of audit engagements rendered by the External Audit Act
3. Audit engagements rendered to foreign clients listed in Korean Exchange
III. Information regarding quality management of audit reports issued by firm
1. Leadership responsibility for firm-wide audit quality
a. Implementation of quality management policy and operations
b. Governance and organizational structure of firm
c. Human resources composition for quality management and status of those personnel
d. Total budgeted (compensation, %) for quality management personnel
2. Relevant ethics requirement(s)
a. Implementation of quality management policy and operations
3. Client relationship management and engagement acceptance and retention
4. Human resources
a. Implementation of quality management policy and operations
b. Evaluation, reward and promotion of employees and partners
5. Production of services
a. Implementation of quality management policy and operations
b. Audit inputs - # of CPAs and # of hours spent in productions
c. Management of high-risk audit clients
6. Monitoring
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a. Implementation of quality management policy and operations
b. Management of audit engagements involving trainee CPAs
c. Internal inspection of engagements and documentation policy
7. Securities investment monitoring system
a. Status and name of the system
b. System monitoring result
IV. Human resources of firm
1. Summary of human resources
2. Summary of equity-holding partners and directors
3. Change in CPAs
4. Experience summary of CPAs employed
5. Employees and total compensation per business unit
6. Other license holdings
V. Contingent liability fund and contingent liability reserve summary
1. Balances of contingent liability fund and contingent liability reserve
2. Purchase of indemnity insurance
VI. Inspection summary about recent three years
1. Inspection on engagements and audit reports
2. Inspection on quality management
VII. Summary of litigation involvement in recent three years
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The Relation between the Timing of Engagement Review and Audit Quality

Jooanne Choi
Gopal V. Krishnan
Abstract
In 2009, both the PCAOB and the IAASB (International Auditing and Assurance Standards
Board) amended their respective auditing standards on engagement quality review,
requiring the engagement quality reviewer to evaluate the significant judgments made by
the engagement team. While AS 1220 does not emphasize the timely execution of the
engagement quality review, IAASB’s ISA 220 specifically does. Thus, empirical evidence
on the relations between the timing of engagement quality review and audit production and
audit quality is of interest to audit regulators and practitioners. Using publicly available
data on audit productions from South Korea, we examine whether and how the timing
(interim vs. year-end) of an audit engagement review is associated with the efficiency and
the effectiveness of engagement quality review efforts. We find that earlier the timing of
engagement quality review is associated with greater effort from the engagement team and
shorter audit reporting lag. We also find that the timing of engagement quality review is
positively associated with audit planning effort. Our findings are likely to be useful to the
PCAOB and other regulators in developing guidance to auditors on implementation and
operations of engagement quality review. We also contribute to the literatures on audit
production and quality control system of auditors by providing empirical evidence on the
varying effectiveness of engagement monitoring efforts and circumstances in which inprocess engagement review are more prominent.
Keywords:

Engagement quality review; audit timing; audit production;
engagement review effort; audit reporting lag
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, both the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and the
IAASB (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board) amended their auditing
standards (AS 1220 and clarified ISA 220, respectively) on engagement quality review,
requiring the engagement quality reviewer to evaluate the significant judgments made by
the engagement team and have the audit opinion reports issued to the client with the
engagement review partner’s agreement and consent to the opinion. Gurbutt et al. (2018)
report that engagement quality reviewers of global network firms (GNF) tend to spend
more engagement review hours and have greater involvement earlier in the audit process
after the effective date of the amended standard.20 The staff white paper also reports that
there are some evidence of improved audit quality in the post-implementation period of AS
1220. The findings in the staff white paper do not establish a causal relationship nor a direct
association between (earlier) the timing of the engagement quality review and audit quality.
Unfortunately, data on engagement review or other audit production information is
not publicly reported from auditors in the United States. We use market data from South
Korea, where the clarified ISA 220 has been adopted since 2009, to investigate whether the
timing of engagement quality review is associated with review efficiency and audit quality.
It is important to study whether and how the timing of engagement quality review is
associated with audit quality, because AS 1220 does not emphasizes the timely execution
of the engagement quality review while ISA 220 clearly specifies that timely engagement
quality review is important to ensure that the engagement team promptly addresses issues

Gurbutt et al. (2018) specifies Deloitte, Ernst & Young (EY), KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC),
BDO and Grant Thornton (GT) as the Big Six in the industry and refer them as GNF auditors in the U.S.
market.
20
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identified by the reviewer to the engagement quality reviewer’s satisfaction. We first
examine whether the timing of engagement review (interim vs. year-end) is associated with
review effort effectiveness and elicit greater effort from the engagement team and
empirically examine the determinants of engagement quality review. We use a sample of
8,954 public audit engagements of manufacturing companies listed in the Korea Stock
Exchange (KRX) in a five-year period of 2016-2020. This includes 487 audit firm-year
observations from registered public accounting firms during the period. Contrary to
Gurbutt et al. (2018), where authors observe upward trend in earlier involvement of
engagement quality reviewer between 2008-2013 in the U.S., we report a downward trend
in the percentage engagement quality review hours spent in interim period in the recent
five-year period in South Korea.
We find that the earlier timing of engagement quality review is positively associated
with greater audit efforts from the engagement team in the pre-COVID period (2016-2018),
but not in the post-COVID period. We also find that the earlier involvement of engagement
quality review is negatively associated with audit reporting lag, suggesting that earlier the
timing of engagement quality review is positively associated with audit quality. Moreover,
we find that the earlier involvement of engagement quality reviewer is positively associated
with audit planning efforts, especially in the pre-COVID-19 period. We also find that the
timing of engagement quality review is positively associated with the timing of partner
involvement in audit production, and the magnitude of planning efforts.
Our findings underscore the significance of the timing of engagement quality review
and inform the PCAOB in developing guidance for auditor quality management system to
enhance audit quality. By documenting empirical evidence on the varying effectiveness of
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engagement review efforts and circumstances in which in-process engagement review is
more prominent, our study also contributes to the literatures on audit production and quality
control system of auditors and provide practitioners with relevant information for designing
and planning of an effective engagement quality review.
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The accounting standards in South Korea has been updated after the major
financial crisis. Shortly after the Asian financial crisis in late 1990, South Korea adopted
the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) as the generally accepted auditing standards
(GAAS) in 1999. Also, after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, the country decided
to adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as the generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). With the voluntary adoption starting in 2009 and
mandatory adoption starting in 2011, K-IFRS has become the GAAP in South Korea;
Before then, the Korean GAAP was mostly similar to the U.S. GAAP.
Later in 2012, Korea has also adopted the clarified ISA of 2009 as the GAAS. This
includes ISA 220, Quality Management for an Audit of Financial Statements, which
addresses engagement partners to “discuss significant matters and significant judgments
arising during the audit engagement, including those identified during the engagement
quality review, with the engagement quality reviewer”, and “not date the auditor’s report
until the completion of the engagement quality review” (Para. 20, 36, A104-106). This
standard also addresses that “an engagement quality review that is conducted in a timely
manner at appropriate stages during the audit engagement may assist the engagement team
in promptly resolving matters raised to the engagement quality reviewer’s satisfaction on
or before the date of the auditor’s report” (Para. A105).
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Consistently, the PCAOB had amended the auditing standards on engagement
quality review in 2009; the board introduced the amended AS 1220, Engagement Quality
Review, which was previously known as Auditing Standard No. 7, which requires the
engagement quality reviewer to evaluate “the significant judgments that relate to
engagement planning [and] the engagement team’s assessment of, and audit responses to
significant risks identified” (Para. 2, 9, 10) and to provide approval before the issuance of
audit opinion report for client use (Para. 13).
In 2014, Regulators in South Korea have also amended the regulation on external
audit for public companies, or the External Audit Act (EAA) to enhance audit transparency
and financial disclosure quality. In South Korea, the EAA not only applies to listed
companies but also to private corporations of certain size.21, Additional disclosure of audit
production details (for companies meeting size thresholds under the EAA was mandated
and audit reports include an appendix summarizing audit production details pertaining to
audit inputs, planning, procedures as well as communication with client governance.
III. RELATED RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Due to limited data availability on engagement quality review, the literature on

Until FY2019, corporations with total assets greater than 12 billion KRW (≈ 12 million USD), or with total
assets great than 7 billion KRW and total liabilities greater than 7 billion KRW, or with more than 300
employees were required to have their financial statement externally audited and disclosed even if they are
private companies. Starting FY2020, private limited liability companies of certain size are also subject to the
EAA, and private companies with total assets or total revenue greater than 50 billion KRW are subject to
mandatory external audit of their financial statements, and the new rule not only applies to private
corporations but also to limited liabilities companies, unless exempted by the ‘small company’ exclusion
criteria.
<Small company criteria for corporation>
<Small company criteria for limited liability partnership
- Total assets less than 12 billion KRW
>
- Total liabilities less than 7 billion KRW
- Total assets less than 12 billion KRW
- Total revenue less than 10 billion KRW
- Total liabilities less than 7 billion KRW
- Less than 100 employees
- Total revenue less than 10 billion KRW
- Less than 100 employees
- Less than 50 equity partners
Listed companies are required to report audited financial statements regardless of their size.
21
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engagement quality review is still very nascent when it comes to specific procedures and
the timing of engagement quality review. An exception is Epps and Messier (2007). In this
study, authors collect and summarize actual review practice of audit firms by comparing
engagement review policies and procedures documented in auditors’ audit manuals,
focusing on general engagement review requirements and the use of checklists or
questionnaires part of the review process. Epps and Messier (2007) document that firms
generally require the review check list or practice aid be completed at the end of the audit,
consistent with the notion that “[the engagement quality review] is intended to be the final
quality control check” (Messier 2010).
Prior studies are still inconclusive on whether the timing of engagement quality
review would be associated with audit quality. Based on a survey of 300 audit partners,
Ayers and Kaplan (1998) document that the reviewer involvement in pre-production stage
helps the overall quality management of firms; they report that client acceptance judgments
made by risk review partners are more conservative than the decisions of engagement
partners. They also document that review partners generally have more public accounting
experience than engagement partners. However, Schneider et al. (2003) question whether
an earlier involvement of review partner actually hinders decision quality of the review
partners. They argue that the review partner’s repeated exposure to the client materials and
the engagement team members will make the reviewer less likely to challenge decisions
made by the engagement team. With audit partners as participants, Schneider et al. (2003)
find no experimental evidence that the reviewer involvement in audit planning stage has a
significant effect on reviewer decision objectivity, measured as the reviewer’s willingness
to agree with the engagement team’s conclusion for the audit at the final stage. However,
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Lambert and Agoglia (2011) find that a delayed delivery of engagement review notes elicits
much less effort from the engagement team; in an experiment with audit practitioners,
authors find that reviewees receiving timely reviews examine more evidence items and
spend more time closing, suggesting that engagement review timing impacts review
effectiveness.
Gurbutt et al. (2018) report a shift in the timing of the engagement quality review
efforts in the post-implementation period of AS 1220, using audit engagements conducted
by global network firm (GNF) auditors in 2008 – 2013. They report an average 1.8 percent
point increase in the proportion of reviewer hours spent in the earlier phases of audit
(preliminary review/ planning/ interim field work), compared to pre-amendment period for
audit engagements conducted by GNF auditors in the U.S. market. They also report some
evidence of improved audit quality in the post-implementation period; both the amount of
waived audit adjustments and the likelihood of audited financial statements’ restatements
is lower in the post-implementation period for the sample of PCAOB inspected audit
engagements from Big Eight22 auditors in the U.S. for the period of 2005-2015. Although
these findings do not establish a causal relationship between the regulatory amendment and
the timing of engagement review, nor the timing of engagement review and audit quality,
they suggest a positive relation between the timing of engagement quality review and audit
quality. Consistently, Gurbutt et al. (2018) also document that engagement quality
reviewers may even directly contribute to audit quality “though participating in audit
planning or refining audit adjustments already identified by the engagement team”.
With conflicting yet limited evidence on whether the timing of engagement quality

Gurbutt et al. (2018) specifies Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC, BDO, GT, Crowe Horwath (Crowe), and RSM
as the Big Eight auditors in the U.S.
22 22
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review is associated with audit quality, we hypothesize that earlier timing of the
engagement quality review will enhance review effort effectiveness, eliciting greater effort
from the engagement team, and review effort efficiency. Aobdia and Petacchi (2020) find
a positive association between higher engagement efforts and audit quality when audit-firm
quality control management system—specifically the internal inspection program—is
effective. If audit firms have designed and implemented their quality management system
in accordance with regulatory guidelines, more effective timing would be associated with
greater engagement efforts. This line of reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1A
The timing of engagement review (interim vs. year-end) is positively associated with
audit efforts.
Also, in the appendix to ISA 220, it is stated that “frequent communications
between the engagement team and the engagement quality reviewer throughout the audit
engagement may assist in facilitating an effective and timely engagement quality review.”
Earlier involvement of engagement quality reviewer in discussions of significant audit
judgments and evaluation of works done by the engagement team will allow the
engagement reviewer to sufficiently communicate with the engagement team and ensure
that the engagement team properly address the points raised by the engagement quality
reviewer before the audit opinion report is available for client use. Gurbutt et al. (2018)
identify insufficient time devoted to the review as a potential root cause that may have
contributed to the PCAOB identified deficiencies in the quality control systems of audit
firms and also document empirical evidence for an increased time pressure on engagement
quality review after the effective dates of AS 1220, as the standards requires greater
engagement quality reviewer involvement and evaluation throughout the audit phases, as
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a potential reason why insufficient review time could have been allocated. We interpret that
the time pressure on engagement quality review can be addressed with earlier involvement
of engagement quality reviewer in the discussion, revision and evaluation of works done
by the engagement team. Therefore, we conjecture that earlier the timing of engagement
review would lead to review efforts, as the earlier involvement in engagement quality
review would mitigate time pressure associated with the review at later phases of audit.
HYPOTHESIS 1B
Earlier the timing of engagement review is positively associated with review efforts.
Documenting review practice of audit firms, Epps and Messier (2007) also provide
some evidence on the determinants of engagement review timing. They report that many
firms require review partner involvement in audit planning for first-year clients and other
high-risk clients. With the 2009 amendments, engagement quality reviewers are now
required by AS 1220 and ISA 220 to discuss and evaluate significant judgements made by
the engagement team throughout different audit phases. Therefore, consistent with Epps
and Messiers (2007), we conjecture that the timing of the engagement quality review would
be earlier for high-risk clients than for low-risk clients, leading to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2
The timing of engagement quality review is earlier for high-risk engagements.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
Measuring the Timing of Engagement Quality Review
To measure the timing of engagement review effort, we calculate the ratio of the
percentage review efforts spent in interim review and the percentage audit efforts exerted
by the engagement team in interim audit to measure engagement review efforts timing
scaled by engagement team effort timing (EQRTIMINGijt = INTRMEQRijt / INTRMENGijt).
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We calculate the percentage of total review efforts spent during the interim review
(INTRMEQRijt) as the number of hours spent during the interim review divided by the total
number of review hours spent for client j in fiscal year t, and the percentage of total
engagement team efforts spent during the interim audit (INTRMENGijt) as number of hours
spent during the interim audit divided by the total number of audit hours spent for client j
in fiscal year t. This is to account for the percentage review efforts dedicated in interim
review; as engagement review require review of working papers, the timing of
engagement-review efforts is also partially determined by the amount of review work
required at an earlier timing because much work has been done early. By standardizing the
review effort timing with the engagement-team effort timing, we measure the review
timing that is rather discretionary from the effort timing of the engagement-team.
We provide a sample audit production disclosure (see Figure 2.1) from Samsung
Electronics for years FY2019 and FY2020 presented in to explain the measures of
engagement review efforts. Deloitte had spent 1,418 hours in engagement quality review
for

audit

of

FY2020

financial

statements

of

Samsung

Electronics

(EQRHRSamsungElectronics,Deloitte,FY2020 = 1,418), of which 156 hours were spent in interim
review. While PwC had spent only 186 hours in engagement quality review in the prior
year for Samsung (EQRHRSamsungElectronics,PwC,FY2019 = 186). Though much less review efforts
were exerted in FY2019 by PwC, review efforts were exerted earlier compared to FY2020;
23 hours of review, or about 17.20 percent of total review efforts was spent during the
interim review (INTRMEQRSamsungElectronics,PwC,FY2019 = 23/186 = 0.1720) compared to about
11.00 percent (INTRMEQRSamsungElectronics,Deloitte,FY2020 = 156/1418 = 0.1100) of total review
efforts was spent during the interim review in FY2020. In FY2019, the engagement team
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from PwC had spent 44,336 hours for Samsung (ENGHRSamsungElectronics,PwC,FY2019 = 44,336),
while the engagement team from Deloitte spent 57,515 hours for Samsung in FY2020
ENGHRSamsungElectronics,Deloitte,FY2019 = 57,515). Engagement teams spent 45.88 percent and
44.62

percent

of

their

efforts

in

FY2020

(INTRMENGSamsungElectronics,Deloitte,FY2020),

and

respectively.

FY2019
In

interim

audit

this

case,

EQRTIMINGSamsungElectronics,Deloitte,FY2020 would be approximately 0.2398 (=11.00%/45.88%)
and

EQRTIMINGSamsungElectronics,PwC,FY2019

would

be

approximately

0.3855

(=17.20%/44.62%). We interpret the estimated EQRTIMING values as that the percentage
of engagement quality review spent in interim review is about 0.2398 times of the
percentage engagement-team efforts spent in interim audit in FY2020, and that the
percentage engagement quality review spent in interim review is about 0.3855 times of the
percentage engagement team efforts spent in interim audit in FY2019.
Measuring audit efforts and engagement quality review efforts
Engagement team effort (EFFORTijt) is the natural logarithm of total hours spent
by the engagement team, excluding hours spent by other experts, specialists and quality
reviewers, for client i in audit of financial statements of fiscal year t. Engagement quality
review effort (EQREFFORTijt) is measured as a log transformation of total engagement
quality review hours spent by the engagement quality reviewer.
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Figure 2.1. Audit efforts allocated to interim and year-end audit for Samsung Electronics in FY2019 and FY2020 by PwC Korea and Deloitte Korea,
respectively.

FY2020
% spent in interim
(Hours spent in
interim)
Total Hours
FY2019
% spent in interim
(Hours spent in
interim)
Total Hours

(A)
Quality
reviewer(s)

(B)
Partner(s)

(C)
Managers

(D)
Staffs

(E)
CPA efforts
(B+C+D)

(F)
Specialists

Efforts spent on
interim audit by
engagement team
(E+F)

Total
(A+E+F)

11.00%
(156)

15.44%
(198)

46.97%
(22,167)

44.50%
(4,194)

45.88%
(26,559)

20.61%
(5,604)

37.77%
(32,163)

37.33%
(32,149)

1,418

1,282

47,191

9,042

57,515

27,195

84,710

86,128

17.20%
(32)

47.52%
(612)

44.55%
(14,976)

44.48%
(4,194)

44.62%
(19,782)

18.54%
(4,287)

35.68%
(24,069)

35.63%
(24,101)

186

1,288

33,619

9,429

44,336

23,117

67,453

67,639
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This table describes a sample observation for illustration. Data are collected from the audit report of Samsung Electronics, retrieved from the DART.
See Appendix 2.B for the original disclosure of audit production details as appendix to the audit report.
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Empirical models
To examine whether the timing of engagement quality review is associated with
audit efforts of the engagement team, we first estimate the association between the review
timing (EQRTIMINGit) and total engagement-team efforts using a regression model below:
Audit Hours = β0 + β1⸱(EQRTIMINGijt) + β2⸱(COVIDt) + β3⸱(EQRTIMINGijt×COVIDt)
+ ƩControls + Industry, Year fixed effects + εijt
(1)
where control variables are both client characteristics, such as client size (SIZEit), market
value of client (MBit), client profitability (ROAit), and characteristics of incumbent auditor,
such as auditor size (AFSIZEjt), and affiliation to global network (AFFILIATEjt), as well as
resource allocation of the engagement, such as overall partner involvement (PTNINVijt),
use of specialist (SPECIALISTijt).
As the sample period includes two fiscal year periods where COVID-19 impacted on usual
business practice across the globe, we also include a dichotomous variable, COVIDt,
indicating observations in the last two years of sample period, and interact with the test
variable, EQRTIMINGijt, to control for the COVID impact. To address other audit risk
factors, we include an audit fee variable estimated to represent audit fee level unexplained
by the cost of audit inputs. (ABFEE). This is estimated as the residual of audit fee model
with audit input variables as regressors. As audit fee is a function of audit input costs and
audit risk premium, we use ABFEE to represent audit risk factors recognized by the auditor
in pricing of the engagement.
For Hypothesis 1a, the dependent variable will be audit hours spent by the
engagement team (EFFORTijt), and for H1b, the dependent variable will be review hours
spent by the engagement quality reviewers (EQREFFORTijt). We draw a scatter plot of the
regression residuals to guestimate the degree of nonlinearity of estimated β1. There are
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certain review activities that must happen at the year-end or after the fieldwork is
completed and there are cases where the interim engagement review is skipped but there is
no case where the year-end engagement review is bypassed. With reasonable evidence that
the estimated β1 is linear, a significant β1 would suggest that the timing of review effort
matters when it comes to audit quality. If earlier the timing of review efforts is more
effective and encourages greater resource allocation from engagement team, the estimated
coefficient β1 would be positive and significant in the regression with EFFORTijt as the
dependent variable. However, if year-end review efforts are more effective and encourage
greater efforts from engagement team, then the estimated coefficient β1 would be negative
and significant. Also, if earlier the timing of review allows the reviewer to exert sufficient
hours to review and evaluate the works done by the engagement team with less time
pressure after the yearend, the estimated coefficient β1 would be positive and significant in
the regression with EQREFFORTijt as the dependent variable.
For Hypothesis 2, we estimate the below regression model to examine whether
audit planning effort or actual days spent in planning for the engagement is positively
associated with an earlier involvement of engagement quality reviewer:
EQRTIMINGijt = β0 + β1⸱(PLANNINGijt) + β2⸱(PTNTIMINGijt) + β3⸱(SPECIALISTjt)
+ β4⸱(NEWijt) + β5⸱(IPOit) + β6⸱(IMPAIRit) + β7⸱(LOSSit)
+ Ind & Year F.E. + εijt
(2)
We also include control variables that are associated with heightened audit risk level and
potentially required additional risk assessment effort in early phases of audit, or actual audit
production characteristics indicating an increases effort in early phases of audit. First, we
include two audit production characteristics: the timing of partner efforts (PTNTIMINGijt)
to proxy for increased risk assessment in early phases of audit as it involved significant
judgments at engagement partners level, and the use of specialist (SPECIALISTijt) as the
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use of specialist required an early coordination. Also, we use dichotomous variables
specifying clients requiring additional risk assessment: first-year clients (NEWijt), IPO
clients (IPOijt), clients with impaired capital (IMPAIRijt) 23, or clients reporting operating
loss (LOSSijt). Moreover, we also include the actual number of days spent in planning of
the engagement (PLANNINGijt) to capture the overall planning efforts allocated to the
engagement.
V. SAMPLE
We collect the variables from annual reports of client companies and registered
public accounting firm in South Korea, available online from the Data Analysis, Retrieval
and Transfer (DART) system between January 1, 2016, to February 22, 2022.
Disclosure of audit-firm annual reports was initiated in 2016 on the DART and we
limit the sample period from 2016 to 2019 and collect information from audit-firm annual
reports and audit reports issued to clients for audit production details for all public
companies listed during the sample period. Table 2.1 reports sample attrition. There are a
total 903 audit-firm annual reports issued for calendar years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and
2020, which correspond to client financial statements ending on December 31 of the prior
year, respectively. Of the 903 audit-firm observations, 297 observations are excluded from
the sample because those observations have no public audit clients in the sample period,
and an additional 119 observations are excluded as some firms only have one or two public

Capital impairment is one of delisting criteria in Korea Stock Exchange. When 50 percent capital
impairment is reported in the bi-annual report or annual report, the company is tagged and subject to special
supervision). Once tagged, such companies are barred from margin trading. If their subsequent (bi-)annual
reports again report greater than 50 percent capital impairment or less than 10 billion KRW (approx. 10
million USD) of equity capital, the companies are delisted from the market. Also, when the entire equity
capital is impaired, issues are delisted from the market immediately. During the calendar year of 2020, total
16 companies were delisted from markets, where 3 companies and 13 companies were listed in KOSPI and
KOSDAQ markets, respectively.
23
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audit clients and we do not have all necessary data for those clients. This leaves a final
sample of 498 audit-firm-year observations.
For the sample period, there are 11,276 firm-year observations from the three
capital markets in South Korea. We exclude 889 client-year observations due to missing
necessary financial statement information and market capitalization data 24 , and 1,429
observations25 due to missing necessary audit information, such as audit fees and audit
efforts. Lastly, four observations with client financial statements with non-December yearend are excluded to ensure consistency in seasonal effect on the timing of engagement
review and engagement-team audit efforts. This yields a final sample of 8,954 client-year
observations with audit engagement details.
Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics of the sample are in Table 2.2. Panel A summarizes audit-firm
characteristics of the sample. On average, public accounting firms have about 27 partners
(PARTNERSjt), with approximately 226 audit clients (ALLCLIENTSjt) of which 27 are
public audit clients (PUBLICCLIENTSjt). The smallest firm in this sample has only four
partners and the partners are the only CPAs of the firm. An average partner tenure with
firm is about 8.66 years (=104 months) and an average partner experience in the industry
is about 18 years (=217.86 months). An average public accounting firm generates a yearly
revenue of 31 billion KRW (≈ 31 million USD) while the largest public accounting firm
763 billion KRW (≈ 763 million USD).

11,276 observations include special-purpose acquisition companies listed in the market, and all of SPCs
are excluded in this first criterion.
25
As foreign-incorporated companies listed in Korea Stock Exchange (usually KOSDAQ) are allowed to
have their financial statements audited by foreign auditors, they are exempted from disclosure of audit
production details. Thus, foreign companies listed in Korea Stock Exchange are dropped under this sample
selection criterion.
24
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Table 2.1 Sample Selection
Panel A Audit-firm level observations
Fiscal year
Number of firms registered for public
accounting
(less) firms with no public audit client
(less) firms with insufficient engagement data
Sample audit-firm-year observations

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Total

165

176

183

185

194

903

(39)
(17)
109

(49)
(11)
116

(48)
(18)
117

(55)
(21)
109

(106)
(50)
38

(297)
(119)
498

Panel B Audit production observations
Fiscal year

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Total

Listed companies in Korean capital markets

2,128

2,194

2,264

2,355

2,335

11,276

779

774

788 3,939799

799

1,208

1,266

1,323 6,607
1,405

1,405

141

154

153

(203)

(163)

(174)

(107)

(889)

(251)

(267)

(356)

(302)

(1,429)

(1)
1,778

(1)
1,864

1,841

1,926

(4)
8,954

KOSPI
KOSDAQ
KONEX

(less) observations missing necessary client
(242)
financial statement information
(less) observations missing necessary external
(253)
audit related information*
(less) non-December year-end companies
(2)
Sample audit production observations
1,672

730 151

131

*This includes foreign companies listed in Korea Stock Exchange exempted from the disclosure requirement
or Korean companies audited by foreign auditor(s) who are not subject to audit production disclosure in
Korea.

Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A Audit-firm level variables.................................................................................... (n = 489)
Variable

Mean

SD

PTNTENUREjt

103.914

55.865

4

26.787

30.931

4

217.860

52.391

1.481

2.486

0

1

21

13.096

26.195

0

4

174

KONEXCLIENTSjt

7.945

25.774

0

1

158

PUBLICCLIENTSjt

26.650

61.623

1

7

404

226.448

292.119

8

127

1784

951

8,840

763,000

PARTNERSjt
PTNEXPjt
KOSPICLIENTSjt
KOSDAQCLIENTSjt

ALLCLIENTSjt
REVENUEjt
AFSIZEjt

31,000

90,500

5

1

Min

45.577

2.197
58

Median
103.860
18
215.400

4.852

Max
263.223
209
403.737

7.487

Panel B Engagement level variables .............................................................................. (n = 8,954)
Variable

Mean

SD

EQRHRijt

27.537

37.614

ENGHRijt

1579.308

EQREFFORTijt

Min

Median

Max

0

17

1418

2290.945

20

1000

57515

3.005

0.761

0

2.890

7.258

EFFORTijt

7.007

0.755

2.996

6.908

10.960

INTRMEQRijt

0.302

0.166

0

0.316

1

INTRMENGijt

0.295

0.136

0

0.286

0.789

INTRPTNijt

0.296

0.161

0

0.286

1

EQRTIMINGijt

1.064

1.406

0

1.000

PTNTIMINGijt

0.296

0.161

0

0.286

1

BIGijt

0.396

0.489

0

0

1

FEEijt

11.440

0.818

8.006

11.290

18.064

ABFEEijt

0.005

0.523

-4.830

0.028

6.923

PTNINVijt

0.156

0.139

0.003

0.095

1

PLANDAYSijt

3.595

7.107

0

2

PLANNINGijt

1.255

0.612

0

1.099

5.257

SPECIALISTijt

0.410

0.492

0

0

1

SIZEit

25.737

1.445

19.218

25.563

33.068

MBit

2.450

11.509

-669.977

1.422

473.206

NEWit

0.291

0.454

0

0

1

IPOit

0.003

0.059

0

0

1

IMPAIRit

0.156

0.363

0

0

1

LOSSit

0.330

0.470

0

0

1

ROAit

-0.009

0.295

0.025

0.947

-16.131

80.833

191

See Appendix 2.A. for definiions of all variables.

Descriptive statistics of engagement-level variables are summarized in Panel B,
Table 2.2. An average audit engagement involves about 27 hours of review efforts
(EQRHRijt) and about 1579 hours of engagement-team efforts (ENGHRijt). About 30.2
percent of total review efforts (INTRMEQRijt) and 29.5 percent of total engagement-team
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efforts (INTRMENGijt) are expended for the interim work, suggesting that less than a third
of the review efforts and audit efforts tend to be allocated to the interim period.
An average EQRTIMINGijt is greater than 1 in the sample, indicating that
engagement reviewer(s) tend to focus more on earlier stage of audit production than the
engagement team overall. Also, PTNTIMINGijt has an average value greater than 1,
suggesting greater partner efforts are allocated to interim works compared to the overall
allocation of engagement-team efforts between interim and year-end, this is consistent with
the general norm that the role of engagement partner is mostly providing critical insights
to the audit and supervising subordinates throughout the engagement, translated into the
need of greater partner involvement in earlier stage of the audit to provide adequate
planning and supervision. However, as minimum values of EQRTIMINGijt and
PTNTIMINGijt are both 0; there are cases where no interim efforts are expended before the
year-end26. Overall, 39.6 percent of sample clients are audited by a Big4 auditor, 29.1
percent of observations are first-year engagements, 15.6 percent of clients have impaired
capital, 33 percent of observations report a net operating loss, and 0.3 percent of sample
observations are IPO companies.
Interestingly, the average percentage effort spent in interim period has been
declining in recent five years in South Korea, while the average actual hours spent in
interim period has been steadily increasing. This trend is observed in partner effort
allocation, engagement-team effort allocation as well as in engagement-quality-reviewer
effort allocation (See Panel A, B, and C of Figure 2.2). This suggest that the increase in
total audit hours spent in an engagement has been increasing more dramatically than the

26

This could also be a last-minute change of the auditor.
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increase in audit hour spent in interim period. However, we do not observe a consistent
upward or downward trend in audit fee level for the sample period as depicted in Panel D
of Figure 2.2.
VI. RESULTS
Univariate analysis
Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables are in Table 2.3. As review
work inevitably involves review of working papers and work done by the engagement team,
engagement review efforts in hours (EQRHRijt) exhibits a high positive correlation (0.750)
with engagement-team efforts in hours (ENGHRijt). A positive and significant correlation
between EQRTIMINGijt and PTNTIMINGijt suggests that engagement review timing is
positively associated with the timing of partner efforts with respect to overall timing of
engagement-team efforts. Also, note that the correlation coefficients between the number
of days spent in audit planning (PLANNINGijt) and the timing of engagement review
(EQRTIMINGijt) is positively significant, suggesting that the timing of reviewer effort is
associated with reviewer involvement in audit planning.
Specialist (SPECIALISTijt) is positively correlated with the percentage of
engagement-team efforts expended in interim audit (INTRMENGijt, 0.030) and the number
of planning days spent (PLANNINGijt, 0.279), but it is negatively correlated with
percentage review efforts spent in interim review (INTRMEQRijt, -0.134) or the timing of
review efforts (EQRTIMINGijt, -0.058). Magnitudes of correlation coefficients between
audit planning effort (PLANNINGijt) and other client characteristics associated with
heightened audit risk and risk assessment requirements are less than 0.35, so we are not
concerned about including audit planning effort (PLANNINGijt) and audit risk factors and
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Figure 2.2
Trend in the magnitude and the timing of audit efforts by various audit participants and audit fee
Panel A The bar graph (orange, left axis in hours) depicts the average audit hours spent by CPAs
in the engagement team, including partners, senior managers, in-charge managers and staffs, in
interim period for sample audit engagements by year. The line graph (black, right axis in percentage)
depicts the average percentage audit hours spent by the engagement team in interim period,
calculated as the hours spent by the engagement team in interim period for an engagement divided
by the total hours spent by the engagement team for the audit engagement, for sample audit
engagements by fiscal year. See Table 1. for the number of engagement and auditor observations
per year.
640
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32%
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30%

560

29%
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28%
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27%
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26%

480

25%
2016

2017

2018
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2019

2020

Panel B The bar graph (orange, left axis in hours) depicts the average audit hours spent by
engagement partner(s) in interim period for sample audit engagements by year. The line graph
(black, right axis in percentage) depicts the average percentage audit hours spent by engagement
partner(s) in interim period, calculated as the hours spent by partner(s) in interim period for an
engagement divided by the hours spent by partner(s) for the entire audit engagement, for sample
audit engagements by fiscal year. See Table 1. for the number of engagement and auditor
observations per year.
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Panel C The bar graph (orange, left axis in hours) depicts the average audit hours spent by the
engagement quality reviewer in interim period for sample audit engagements by year. The line
graph (black, right axis in percentage) depicts the average percentage audit hours spent by the
engagement quality reviewer in interim period, calculated as the hours spent by the engagement
quality reviewer in interim period for an engagement divided by the total hours spent by the
engagement quality reviewer for the entire engagement, from sample audit engagements by fiscal
year.
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Panel D The bar graph (orange, left axis in 1,000 KRW), depicts the average audit fee for a public
engagement by year. The line graph (black, right axis in 1,000 KRW/ hour) depicts the fee to total
audit hours ratio which can be read as the average fee paid per an hour spent in audit of the public
client by year.
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Figure 2.3
Scatter plots illustrating cross-sectional Pearson correlation coefficients between two variables
Panel A: INTRMENGijt and INTRMEQRijt

Panel B: INTRMEQRijt and PLANNINGijt (blue line)
and EQRTIMINGijt and PLANNINGijt (orange dotted line)
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an audit production characteristic increasing planning and risk assessment efforts (NEWijt,
IPOit, IMPAIRit, LOSSit, SPECIALISTijt) together as regressors in a regression model.
However, the correlation coefficient between variables seems to change over time.
We observe notable changes in correlation coefficients between variables in the sample
period. For example, while the correlation coefficient between INTRMEQRijt and
INTRMENGijt is 0.504 and significant for the entire sample, we find that the correlation
coefficient between (INTRMEQRijt, INTRMENGijt) is smaller for a more recent sample
fiscal year. As depicted in Figure 3a, the positive correlation between two variables has
been consistently decreasing in the sample period, from 0.546 in FY2016 to 0.408 in
FY2020. The correlation coefficients for each fiscal year in Figure 3a are all significant at
1 percent level.
Timing of Engagement Quality Review and Audit Efforts
Regression coefficient estimates of model (1) to examine whether the timing and
engagement quality review is positively associated with audit efforts from engagement
team and total engagement quality review efforts are summarized in Table 4. Both models
have mean VIFs of regressors below 2, where no individual regressor has VIF greater than
2.5, suggesting that the regression models do not suffer from multicollinearity arise from
high correlation between regressors. As presented in column (1), we find a positive and
significant coefficient of (0.031) EQRTIMINGijt on engagement-team efforts (EFFORTijt).
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Table 2.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients
EQRHRijt

ENGHRijt

EFFORTijt INTRMEQRijt INTRMENGijt INTRMPTNijt EQRTIMINGijt PTNTIMINGijt

(n = 8,954)
FEEijt
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ENGHRijt

0.750***

EFFORTijt

0.578***

0.721***

INTRMEQRijt

-0.026*

0.043***

-0.043***

INTRMENGijt

0.199***

0.331***

0.253***

0.504***

INTRMPTNijt

0.142***

0.248***

0.195***

0.452***

0.770***

EQRTIMINGijt

-0.021*

0.002

-0.048***

0.317***

-0.071***

-0.011

PTNTIMINGijt

0.014

0.013

-0.005

0.012

-0.106***

0.299***

0.482***

FEEijt

0.709***

0.868***

0.682***

0.015

0.282***

0.215***

-0.039***

-0.018

ABFEEijt

-0.008

0.383***

0.257***

0.096***

0.214***

0.171***

-0.030**

-0.046***

0.631***

PTNINVijt

-0.262***

-0.452***

-0.347***

0.080***

-0.110***

-0.091***

0.040***

-0.034**

-0.369***

PLANNINGijt

0.417***

0.419***

0.301***

-0.038***

0.030**

0.016

0.038***

0.051***

0.399***

SPECIALISTijt

0.359***

0.529***

0.478***

-0.134***

0.123***

0.076***

-0.058***

-0.001

0.499***

SIZEit

0.669***

0.797***

0.601***

0.163***

0.442***

0.346***

-0.007

-0.013

0.723***

MBit

-0.027*

-0.031**

-0.014

-0.024*

-0.042***

-0.035***

-0.002

0.003

-0.020

NEWit

-0.020

-0.023*

-0.037***

-0.049***

-0.095***

-0.058***

0.000

0.017

0.058***

IPOit

-0.014

-0.016

-0.002

-0.057***

-0.060***

-0.049***

-0.028**

-0.003

IMPAIRit

-0.085***

-0.133***

-0.088***

-0.083***

-0.150***

-0.126***

-0.025*

-0.009

-0.057***

LOSSit

-0.064***

-0.071***

-0.049***

-0.058***

-0.116***

-0.091***

-0.013

-0.009

-0.030**

ROAit

0.039***

0.061***

0.032**

0.079***

0.113***

0.093***

0.004

0.034**

ABFEEijt
PTNINVijt

PTNINVijt PLANNINGijt SPECIALISTijt

SIZEit

MBit

0.029**

NEWit

IMPAIRit

0.124***

-0.174***

SPECIALISTijt

0.329***

-0.512***

0.279***

SIZEit

0.315***

-0.363***

0.339***

0.454***

-0.001

0.001

-0.001

-0.097***

0.079***

0.015

-0.037***

-0.136***

0.020

-0.051***

0.022*

0.042***

0.000

NEWit

0.059***

IPOit

0.023*

-0.012

-0.011

0.013

IMPAIRit

-0.011

0.140***

-0.033**

-0.103***

-0.344***

0.130***

0.181***

0.038***

LOSSit

-0.001

0.103***

-0.019

-0.091***

-0.262***

0.072***

0.101***

-0.001

0.455***

-0.057***

0.012

0.035**

0.243***

-0.143***

-0.074***

-0.013

-0.356***

ROAit

LOSSit

-0.291***

PLANNINGijt

MBit

IPOit

0.001

0.022*

*, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. See Appendix 2.A. for definitions of all variables.
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-0.381***

The negative coefficient of COVIDt suggests that audit hours spent by the engagement team
was lower during the COVID-19. We also find a positive and significant coefficient on the
interaction term of EQRTIMINGijt and COVIDt, which can be interpreted that the earlier
involvement of engagement quality reviewer during the COVID-19 period was more
effective in eliciting efforts from the engagement team than during the pre-COVID period.
Estimated coefficient of partner involvement is negative and significant (-0.666), which is
consistent with the notion that quality input (partner participation) can reduce the total
quantity input to audit production. Estimated coefficients on the use of specialist (0.185) is
positive and significant, which can be interpreted that the use of specialist required
additional hours from the engagement team to understand and assume the work of specialist
to express an audit opinion. The positive and significant coefficient of audit fee level
unexplained (ABFEE) by input cost (0.131) is consistent with the notion that auditors exert
greater effort for clients with higher risk.
Presented in column (2) is estimated coefficients for model (1) with total
engagement quality review efforts as a dependent variable. We do not find significant
evidence that the timing of engagement quality review is associated with total engagement
quality review efforts and H1b is not fully supported. However, we find a negative and
significant coefficient on COVIDt, suggesting that limited resources for the engagement
quality reviewers must have resulted in smaller number of hours spent in review of
engagements, on average, during the COVID-19 period. We also find a positive and
significant coefficient (0.427) on the interaction of EQRTIMINGijt and COVIDt, which
supports H1b with a condition. This can be interpreted that an earlier involvement of
engagement quality reviewer is critical in ensuring that the engagement quality reviewer
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to allocate sufficient effort in review and evaluation of works from the engagement team
when resources are limited due to exogenous shock. Also, we find that the estimated
coefficients for AFSIZEjt (-0.159) and AFFILIATEjt (-0.105) are negative and significant
on total review efforts (EQREFFORTijt). This may be attributed to stronger system of
quality control for larger audit firms and firms with access to the global support for quality
management; engagement quality reviewers of those firms are probably reply on the
system of quality control and spend less hours in engagement quality review.
Audit Planning Efforts and The Timing of Engagement Quality Review
Regression coefficient estimates of model (2) to examine whether and how client
risk factors and audit production characteristics are associated with the timing of
engagement quality review are summarized in Table 2.5, column (1). Consistent with H2,
we find a positive and significant coefficient of PLANNINGijt, suggesting that an earlier
involvement of engagement quality reviewer is associated with greater need for discussion
and evaluation of significant judgments made in audit planning stage.
To further examine whether the positive association is due to increased engagement
quality review efforts in interim period or decreased efforts at year-end, we estimate how
the planning efforts are associated with the magnitudes of interim and year-end review
efforts, after controlling for the magnitude of engagement partner and the engagement team
efforts at each period, and the results are in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.5.
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Table 2.4 Engagement Review Timing, Quality Reviewer Effort and Engagement-Team Efforts
(n = 8,954)

EQRTIMINGijt
COVID × EQRTIMING
COVIDt
PTNINVijt
SPECIALISTijt
AFFILIATEjt
AFSIZEjt
ABFEEijt
SIZEit
MBit
ROAit
constant
Adj. R2

(1)

(2)

EFFORT

EQREFFORT

0.031***
(5.22)
0.373***
(24.46)
-0.033***
(-4.94)
-0.666***
(-12.40)
0.185***
(16.13)
0.077***
(5.74)
-0.010
(-1.43)
0.131***
(7.59)
0.362***
(63.91)
0.001*
(1.89)
-0.294***
(-3.59)
-2.489***
(-16.61)
0.736

0.005
(1.35)
0.427***
(16.48)
-0.036**
(-1.97)
-0.660***
(-12.96)
0.466***
(29.42)
-0.105***
(-5.13)
-0.159***
(-17.04)
0.027*
(1.70)
0.265***
(43.83)
0.001*
(1.92)
-0.228***
(-3.44)
-3.003***
(-18.56)
0.516

This table summarizes regression results for engagement review timing on audit efforts. Regression models
are estimated with both fiscal year and industry fixed effects. First column presents regression estimates of
engagement-team’s audit efforts on engagement review timing and the second column presents regression
estimates of total engagement quality review efforts on engagement review timing. White (1980) robust
standard errors are used to estimate the statistical significance levels, and *, **, *** denote two-tailed
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, and numbers in parentheses are test statistics. See
Appendix 2.A. for definitions of all variables.
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Table 2.5 Determinants of Engagement Quality Review Timing

PLANNINGijt
PTNTIMINGijt

(1)

(2)

EQRTIMING

INTEQR

YEEQR

0.055***
(4.69)

-0.005
(-0.47)

0.136**
(1.98)
-0.112
(-0.81)

INTPEFFORTijt

0.105***
(12.41)
0.287***
(46.97)

INTEFFORTijt
YEPEFFORTijt
YEEFFORTijt
SPECIALISTijt
NEWit
IPOit
IMPAIRit
LOSSit
constant

Adj. R2

(n = 8,954)
(3)

0.010
(0.25)
-0.623***
(-5.71)
-0.109***
(-3.93)
-0.022
(-0.84)
1.079***
(16.00)
0.010
(0.25)

0.114***
(7.56)
-0.004
(-0.28)
0.171***
(3.00)
-0.010
(-0.54)
-0.011
(-0.76)
-0.229***
(-9.79)

0.008

0.531

0.000
(0.03)
0.611***
(45.66)
0.279***
(16.85)
-0.055***
(-4.05)
0.182**
(2.04)
0.025
(1.31)
0.004
(0.30)
-1.635***
(-21.87)
0.508

This table summarizes determinants of engagement quality review timing. Regression models
are estimated with both fiscal year and industry fixed effects. Column one presents regression
estimates of engagement quality review timing (EQRTIMINGijt). Column two and three
presents regression estimates of interim review efforts (INTEQRijt) and year-end review efforts
(YEEQRijt) to further explore whether the variance in review timing is driven by interim review
effort, year-end review effort, or both. INTEQRijt is a natural logarithm of interim engagement
quality review efforts in hours and YEEQRijt is a natural logarithm of year-end engagement
quality review efforts in hours. White (1980) robust standard errors are used to estimate the
statistical significance levels, and *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels, respectively, and numbers in parentheses are test statistics. See Appendix 2.A.
for definitions of all variables.
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Consistent with the hypothesis, the estimated coefficient of PLANNINGijt is positive and
significant in column (2) but negative and insignificant in column (3), suggesting that the
magnitude of audit planning effort is positively associated with greater engagement quality
reviewer involvement in interim period and the positive association with the timing is not
driven by reduced review efforts at year-end.
Interestingly, we find a negative and significant coefficient on IPO in column (1),
suggesting that the timing and engagement quality review is earlier for IPO clients.
However, in further regression results presented in column (2) and (3) of Table 2.5, we
also find positive and significant coefficient on IPOit, while the magnitude of coefficient is
larger in column (3). These results together suggest that engagement quality reviewers
exert additional review efforts for IPO clients yet the increase in effort is greater at yearend than in interim period, so the timing of engagement quality review is rather later
compared to that of non-IPO clients. Also, we find no significant association between the
use of specialist (SPECIALISTijt) and the timing of engagement quality review in column
(1) of Table 2.5, but significant positive associations between the use of specialist and both
interim and yearend engagement quality review efforts in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.5.
These findings are consistent with the positive association between the use of specialist
(SPECIALISTijt) and engagement-team efforts (EFFORTijt) reported in Table 2.4. This may
suggest that the use of specialist does not only require additional efforts from the
engagement team but also from the engagement quality reviewer that the use of specialist
is not associated with the timing of the engagement quality review (EQRTIMINGijt).
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Additional Analysis
Engagement Quality Review Timing and Audit Reporting Lag
As audit opinion reports are not delivered to clients until “the completion of the
engagement quality review27” (ISA 220, Para. 20, 36, A104-106), audit reporting lag would
best serve the purpose of testing for the implication of engagement quality review timing
on audit outcome quality. As the value of audit opinion and the information contained in
the audited financial statements will decline as there is a longer lag in delivery from the
fiscal yearend, a negative association between the timing of engagement quality review
and audit reporting lag would suggest that the engagement quality review timing is also an
audit process quality indicator.
We collect audit report dates as the dates when the audit report is disclosed in the
electronic disclosure system. Audit reporting lag (AUDLAGijt) is measured as the number
of days spend from the fiscal year-end until the audit report date. Excluding client-year
observations that has filed an extension for disclosure deadline and restated its financial
statement in the future period, we have 7,185 client-year observations for this analysis as
summarized in Panel A. of Table 2.6. Average audit reporting lag is about 89 days, except
for FY2020, where the reporting deadline is 90 days from the fiscal yearend for listed
companies. As many listed companies have requested extension for filing deadline, the
average audit reporting lag is much lower in FY2020, because the sample is skewed to
those companies with willingness and ability to file the annual reports with audited

This is consistent with the PCAOB standard: AS 1220, Para. 13: In an audit, the firm may grant permission
to the client to use the engagement report only after the engagement quality reviewer provides concurring
approval of issuance.
27
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financial statements before the deadline. To test whether the timing of engagement quality
review is associated with audit reporting lag, we estimate the below regression model:
AUDLAGijt = β0 + β1⸱(EQRTIMINGijt) + β2⸱(EFFORTijt) + β3⸱(COVIDjt)
+ ƩControls + Ind & Year F.E. + εijt

(3)

where control variables include both auditor characteristics (AFFILIATEjt, AFSIZEjt), client
characteristics (SIZEit, MBit, ROAit, NEWijt, IPOit, IMPAIRit, LOSSit) as well as audit fee
level unexplained by the levels of input cost drivers (ABFEEijt) to control for other audit
risk factors priced in audit fee as risk premium. Regression results are summarized in Panel
B. of Table 2.6, as we find a negative and significant coefficient on EQRTIMINGijt,
suggesting that earlier the timing of engagement quality review is positively associated
with timely delivery of audited financial statements to the capital market, and hence,
superior audit outcome quality.

Table 2.6 Engagement Quality Review Timing and Audit Reporting Lag
Panel A Descriptive Statistics of Audit Reporting Lag (AUDLAGDAYSijt)
2016
2017
2018
2019
Obs.
1,339
1,324
1,486
1,560
Mean
89.38
89.28
89.185
89.51
SD
2.19
1.37
1.77
1.78
Min
55
68
59
62
Median
90
89
90
90
Max
90
90
90
90
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2020
1,478
77.13
4.32
41
77
90

All
7,187
86.83
5.55
41
90
90

Panel B. Regression Results .......................................... (n = 7,187)
AUDLAGijt
EQRTIMINGijt

-0.320**
(-2.53)
-0.086***
(-3.30)
-5.564***
(-44.32)
0.105
(0.78)
-1.069***
(-5.87)
0.030
(0.38)
0.689***
(5.54)
-0.150**
(-2.28)
0.005
(0.94)
-0.439**
(-1.97)
-1.327***
(-10.80)
2.417***
(2.80)
0.422**
(2.47)
-0.072
(-0.55)
96.414***
(70.88)

EFFORTijt
COVIDt
OTHERPARTijt
AFFILIATEjt
AFSIZEjt
ABFEEjt
SIZEit
MBit
ROAit
NEWijt
IPOit
IMPAIRit
LOSSit
constant

Adj. R2

0.313

Panel A. summarizes descriptive statistics of audit reporting lag in days
(AUDLAGADAYS) by sample fiscal year. Panel B. summarizes regression
results for the association between engagement quality review timing and
audit reporting lag (AUDLAG = ln(AUDLAGDAYS+1). Regression models
are estimated with both fiscal year and industry fixed effects. White (1980)
robust standard errors are used to estimate the statistical significance levels,
and *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively, and numbers in parentheses are test statistics. See Appendix 2.A.
for definitions of all variables.
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Cross-sectional Analyses
We acknowledge that there are many factors that could potentially confound the
empirical results, and it is possible that the associations we observe are driven by a
combination of these factors. We also observed that the correlation coefficients between
variables are changing over the sample period, and we also acknowledge that the last two
years of sample period are unusually different due to COVID-19. Among many possible
changes, there were additional disclosure requirement on firm-level quality control system
and internal policy and procedures for engagement quality review had become effective
for audit-firm annual reports of FY2018 or later, which creates a change in institutional
setting for the market awareness of auditors’ system of quality control and engagement
quality review. Also, as presented in Figure 2.3, the correlation coefficients between two
variables

(INTRMENGijt

and

INTRMEQRijt),

consisting

of

the

test

variable

(EQRTIMINGijt), has been declining during the sample period. Therefore, we re-estimated
model (1) and (2) by fiscal year for cross-sectional regression estimates to find out whether
the findings are robust to varying relationship among regressors over the sample period.
Cross-sectional regression results are summarized in Table 2.7.
Panel A of Table 2.7 presents cross-sectional regression estimates of model (1) with
total engagement-team efforts (EFFORTijt) as dependent variable, without fiscal year fixed
effect. Coefficients estimated for control variables are not tabulated, however, estimated
coefficients were consistent in terms of direction and significance for control variables for
all five cross-sectional regression estimates. Consistent with the result in Table 2.4, we find
positive and significant coefficients for EQRTIMINGijt for non-COVID years, but no
significant coefficients in years impacted by COVID-19. These results suggest that the
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engagement quality review timing implication in eliciting engagement-team’s audit effort
was not applicable during the COVID-19 impacted period when travel for on-site audit
field works is restricted, although substituted. Panel B of Table 2.7 presents cross-sectional
regression estimates of model (1) without fiscal year fixed effect with total engagement
quality review efforts (EQREFFORTijt) as dependent variable. Consistent with the result
in Table 2.4, we do not find a significant association between the engagement quality
review timing and total engagement quality review efforts, except for FY2020, where there
is a negative coefficient on EQRTIMINGijt is reported with 10 percent significance. Panel
C of Table 2.7 presents cross-sectional regression estimates of model (2) without fiscal
year fixed effect. Consistent with the main result in Table 2.5, we find positive and
significant coefficients of audit planning efforts (PLANNINGijt) with absence of COVID19, in fiscal years 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. As most planning for audit engagements
occur before the client’s fiscal year, audit planning for client financial statements for
FY2019 with December yearend must have occurred before the pandemic was declared in
January 2020. Interestingly, the model coefficients of determination have dropped
significantly in the cross-sectional estimations of model (3) for FY2019 and FY2020. This
also suggest that the timing of engagement quality review was much impacted by the
COVID-19 driven exogenous shock to the audit industry and work environment.
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Table 2.7 Cross-sectional regressions by fiscal year
Panel A Engagement quality review timing and engagement-team efforts estimated by fiscal year
Sample year:
EQRTIMINGijt

FY2016

FY2017

FY2018

FY2019

FY2020

EFFORTijt

EFFORTijt

EFFORTijt

EFFORTijt

EFFORTijt

-0.013
(-0.62)

-0.002
(-0.77)

0.024*
(1.69)

Controls & Fixed effects
n
Adj. R2

0.034***
(4.60)

0.034***
(4.05)

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

1,631
0.699

1,739
0.704

1,833
0.723

1,825
0.754

1,926
0.784

Panel B Engagement quality review timing and total engagement quality review efforts estimated by fiscal year
Sample year:
EQRTIMINGijt
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Controls & Fixed effects
n
Adj. R2

FY2016
EQRijt
0.002
(0.23)

FY2017
EQRijt
0.005
(0.67)

FY2018
EQRijt
0.003
(0.35)

FY2019
EQRijt
-0.035
(-1.64)

FY2020
EQRijt
-0.020*
(-1.80)

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

1,631
0.432

1,739
0.452

1,833
0.502

1,825
0.607

1,926
0.560

Panel C. Audit planning efforts and engagement quality review timing estimated by fiscal year
Sample year:
PLANNINGijt

Controls & Fixed effects
n
Adj. R2

FY2016
EQRTIMINGijt
1.360***
(4.13)

FY2017
EQRTIMINGijt
1.456***
(4.63)

FY2018
EQRTIMINGijt
1.404***
(3.89)

FY2019
EQRTIMINGijt
0.169**
(2.22)

FY2020
EQRTIMINGijt
0.008
(0.03)

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

1,631
0.649

1,739
0.616

1,833
0.447

1,825
0.060

1,926
0.001

Panel A and B summarizes regression coefficients estimated for EQRTIMING using modified model (1) without fiscal year fixed effect, with engagement-team efforts (EFFORT) and total engagement
quality review efforts (EQREFFORT) as dependent variables, estimated cross-sectionally by fiscal year. Panel C. summarizes regression coefficients estimated for PLANNING using model (2) without
fiscal year fixed effect, estimated cross-sectionally by fiscal year. White (1980) robust standard errors are used to estimate the statistical significance levels, and *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, and numbers in parentheses are test statistics. See Appendix 2.A. for definitions of all variables.

VII. CONCLUSION
The PCAOB has called for academic research and comments on revising the current
quality control standards on public audit. We respond to this call by providing empirical
evidence that a greater percentage of engagement review efforts spent on interim review
efforts relative to the timing of engagement-team efforts is positively
associated with engagement-team efforts, suggesting that timely engagement quality
review would encourage greater effort from the engagement team. We also find that the
association is robust in absence of exogenous shock like COVID-19, and an earlier
involvement of engagement quality reviewer is negatively associated with audit reporting
lag, suggesting superior audit quality. This suggest that encouraging earlier involvement
of engagement quality reviewer would encourage engagement teams to exert sufficient and
adequate audit efforts and conclude with audit opinions in timelier manner. We also find
that the earlier timing of engagement quality review is positively associated with audit
planning effort, consistent with both IAS 220 and AS 1220 requiring engagement quality
reviewer to involve in discussion and evaluation of significant judgments made by the
engagement team from early on in risk assessment and planning for the audit engagement.
We believe that the findings provide useful information for auditors interested in designing
and enhancing their engagement quality review process as well as the PCAOB and other
regulators seeking for better understanding of whether the timing of engagement quality
review is associated with audit quality, and the determinants of the engagement quality
review timing. Findings suggest that encouraging earlier review efforts would promote
higher quality audit with greater efforts and benefit information users in the capital market.
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Future research can examine whether reviewer-specific characteristics are also associated
with engagement review timing and further expand on this issue.
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Appendix 2.A Variable definitions

ALLCLIENTSjt

Abnormal audit fee paid by client i in fiscal year t by auditor j, measured as
regression residual of below model, estimated cross-sectionally by fiscal year with
industry fixed effects:
EQRHRijt = β0 + β1⸱(PHRijt) + β2⸱(CPAHRijt) + β3⸱(STFFHRijt) +β4⸱(SPSTHRijt)
+β5⸱(BIGjt) +β6⸱(PUBLICBIZjt) +β7⸱(AFSIZEjt) + εijt
Audit-firm size measured as a natural logarithm of number of audit clients of firm
j in fiscal year t.
Number of all audit clients of firm j in fiscal year t.

AUDLAGijt

= ln(AUDLAGDAYSijt)

AUDLAGDAYSijt

Number of days since the fiscal yearend until the audit report date

BIGijt

1 if auditor of client i in fiscal year t is either Deloitte, EY, KPMG or PwC Korea.
1 if fiscal year was impacted by COVID-19; client-year observations in FY2019
and FY2020 are considered COVID-19 impacted.
Audit-firm ownership disparity as defined in Choi and Krishnan (2020); range of
ownership holdings among equity partners of firm j as of fiscal year t.
A natural logarithm of audit hours spent by engagement team for client i in fiscal
year t by auditor j;
= ln(ENGHRijt)
Engagement team efforts in hours spent for client i in fiscal year t by auditor j; This
is total audit hours spent by CPA of the engagement team.
A natural logarithm of engagement quality review hours spent by engagement
quality reviewer for client i in fiscal year t by auditor j;
= ln(EQRHRijt)
Engagement quality review efforts in hours spent for client i in fiscal year t by
auditor j.
Engagement quality review timing measured as the ratio of percentage interim
review efforts to percentage interim audit efforts for client i in fiscal year t by
auditor j; INTRMENGijt/INTRMEQRijt
A natural logarithm of audit fee in thousand KRW (approx. 1 USD) paid by client
i in fiscal year t to auditor j
1 if the equity capital is impaired for client i in fiscal year t.
Client importance to the auditor as audit fee earned from client i scaled by total
audit revenue of auditor j in fiscal year t.
Interim audit effort expended to engagement i in fiscal year t by auditor j, as a
natural logarithm of interim engagement-team efforts + 1.
Interim engagement partner hours expended to engagement i in fiscal year t by
auditor j, as a natural logarithm of interim partner audit hours + 1.
Interim engagement quality review efforts for engagement i in fiscal year t by
auditor j, as a natural logarithm of interim engagement review efforts + 1.
Percentage engagement team efforts exerted in interim review, measured as hours
spent in interim audit divided by total hours spent for client i in fiscal year t by
auditor j.
Percentage engagement quality review efforts exerted in interim review, measured
as hours spent in interim review divided by total review hours spent for client i in
fiscal year t by auditor j.
Percentage partner efforts exerted in interim review, measured as partner hours
spent in interim audit divided by total partner hours spent for client i in fiscal year
t by auditor j.
1 if it is the year before or the year of initial public offering for client i in fiscal
year t.
Number of public audit clients listed in KONEX market of client i in fiscal year t.

ABFEEijt

AFSIZEjt

COVIDt
DISPARITYjt
EFFORTijt
ENGHRijt
EQREFFORT
EQRHRijt
EQRTIMINGijt
FEEijt
IMPAIRit
IMPORTANTijt
INTEFFORTijt
INTPEFFORTijt
INTEQRijt
INTRMENGijt

INTRMEQRijt

INTRMPTNijt
IPOit
KONEXCLIENTSjt
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KOSDAQCLIENTSjt

Number of public audit clients listed in KODSAQ market of firm j in fiscal year t.

KOSPICLIENTSjt

Number of public audit clients listed in KOSPI market of firm j in fiscal year t.

LOSSit

1 if client i has reported negative earnings in fiscal year t.
Market to book ratio of client i in fiscal year t, measured as calendar year average
market capitalization divided by book value
1 if it is the first-year auditor j is engaged with client i in fiscal year t.
Number of CPA employees, including the number of partners, working for firm j
in fiscal year t.
1 if auditor j utilized other audit participant(s) in financial statement audit of client
i in fiscal year t.
Number of partners of firm j in fiscal year t.
Engagement partner involvement in audit of client i in fiscal year t as engagement
partner efforts scaled by both auditor and other audit participant efforts.
Number of audit planning days spent and reported in the appendix of audit report
for client i in fiscal year t by auditor j.
= ln(PLANDAYSijt + 1).

MBit
NEWit
NUMCPAjt
SPECIALISTijt
PARTNERSjt
PTNINVijt
PLANDAYSijt
PLANNINGijt
PTNEXPjt
PTNTENUREjt
PTNTIMINGijt
PUBLICBIZjt
PUBLICCLIENTSjt
REVENUEjt
ROAit
SALESit
SIZEit
YEEFFORTijt
YEPEFFORTijt
YEEQRijt

Average partner experience in months of firm j in fiscal year t.
Average partner tenure in months; Number of months partner has worked for firm
j as of fiscal year t.
Partner involvement timing measured as the ratio of percentage interim partner
efforts to percentage interim audit efforts for client i in fiscal year t by auditor j.
Percentage total revenue earned from public audit business for auditor j in fiscal
year t.
Number of public audit clients of for firm j in fiscal year t.
Audit-firm revenue in million KRW (approx. thousand USD) of firm j in fiscal
year t.
Return on assets of client i in fiscal year t as income before extraordinary items
divided by total assets.
A natural logarithm of total revenue reported by client i in fiscal year t; firms
reporting zero revenue are replaced with 1 KRW of revenue so that a log
transformation results in zero.
Client size is measured as a natural logarithm of total assets of client i in fiscal year
t.
Year-end audit effort expended to engagement i in fiscal year t by auditor j, as a
natural logarithm of year-end engagement-team efforts + 1.
Year-end partner efforts expended to engagement i in fiscal year t by auditor j, as
a natural logarithm of year-end partner audit hours + 1.
Year-end engagement quality review efforts for engagement i in fiscal year t by
auditor j, as a natural logarithm of year-end engagement review efforts + 1.
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Appendix 2.B Examples of audit production detail appendices
Audit production of Anjin Deloitte for FY2020 Financial Statements of Samsung Electronics
1. Audit Subject
Subject Company
Subject Period

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
From
2020.01.01
to

2. Audit Participant Details

2020.12.31

(Unit: capita, hour)
Auditor (CPA)

Participants
∖
Headcount ·
Input Hour
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Headcount
Interim
Hours
Year-end
spent
Total

Quality
Control/
Review
Partner

Managers
(Licensed
CPA)

Engagement
Partner

Current Past* Current
16
17
1
156
32
198
1,262
154
1,084
1,418
186
1,282

Past*
1
612
676
1,288

Staffs
(Certified
CPA)

Current Past*
52
26
22,167 14,976
25,024 18,643
47,191 33,619

Current
23
4,024
5,018
9,042

Past*
18
4,194
5,235
9,429

Order-based
industry
(i.e. LTCC)
specialists

IT, Tax,
Appraisal
Specialists

Total

Current Past* Current Past* Current Past*
83
74
175
136
5,604 4,287
32,149 24,101
21,591 18,830
53,979 43,538
27,195 23,117
86,128 67,639

*Prior-year auditor was Samil PwC.

3. Major Audit Practice Details
Category

Details
Conduct Period

Audit Planning

2020.03.09. ~ 2020.09.30
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day(s)

Based on overall understanding on the company and the industry, (we) assessed risk
factors associated with the engagement and determined the nature, timing, and scope
of audit.
Input Headcount
Conduct Period
Conduct Details
Full-time
Part-time
System and automated
2020.04.09–2021.01.29
120
day(s)
13 auditors
24 auditors
internal controls audit
2020.03.09–2020.12.31
83
day(s)
44 auditors
38 auditors
Interim audit
Confirmations and updates
2021.01.11–2021.01.22
10
day(s)
40 auditors
6 auditors
on interim audit results
Audit on financial statement
2021.01.28–2021.02.17
15
day(s)
40 auditors
3 auditors
accounts and audit closing
Inspection Period
2020.11.29/ 2020.11.30/ 2020.12.1
3
day(s)
Inspection Location
Suwon, Giheung, Gumi, Gwangju Offices
Inspection Subject
Raw materials, work-in-process products, final products, etc.
Inspection Period
2021.01.05/ 2021.01.07
2
day(s)
Inspection Location
Taepyung-ro and Suwon campuses
Inspection Subject
Cash, Securities etc.
Bank Inquiry
○
Bond debt inquiry
○
Lawyer inquiry
○
Other Inquiries
Consignment asset(s) inquiry
Number of Communications
4
times
Communication dates
2020.04.27/ 2020.07.28/ 2020.10.27/ 2021.01.26
Purpose
N/A
Participation dates
days(s)
Conduct Details

Field
Practice

Inventory
Inspections
(/Observations)
Financial Asset
Inspections
(/Observations)
Audit Inquiries
Communication with
governance
Use of external
specialists

4. Communication with Governance
No.
Date
Participants
1
2020.04.27.
Audit committee: Three members
Company: Internal audit leader
Auditor: Engagement partner and one
auditor
2
2020.07.28.
Audit committee: Three members
Company: Internal audit leader
Auditor: Engagement partner and one
auditor

Method
In-person

In-person

3

2020.10.27.

Audit committee: Three members

In-person

4

2021.01.26.

Company: Internal audit leader

In-person

Communication matters
Annual communication plan with the governance
Annual audit planning and timeline
Quarterly audit review/ independence confirmation with
respect to non-audit services
Annual audit timeline and in-progress updates
Plan on identifying key audit matters
ICFR audit in-progress
Items identified during the quarterly audit review and
other necessary communication matters
Plan on identifying key audit matters
ICFR audit in-progress
Items identified during the quarterly audit review and
other necessary communication matters
Key audit matters
ICFR audit in-progress
Other necessary communication matters

The Role of Audit-firm Governance in Audit Production: Evidence from Korea

Jooanne Choi
Gopal V. Krishnan

Abstract
There is a paucity of evidence on whether and how the governance of audit firms influences
audit production. Using the Korean setting, we examine the audit production implications
of two governance attributes: the degree of shirking incentive among partners, measured
by disparity in equity holdings of partners and delegation of control from non-managing
partners to managing partners. We find that both equity disparity and control-ownership
wedge are positively associated with total audit hours and partner involvement in average
audit production. We also find that while the equity disparity and control-ownership wedge
are both positively associated with client retention, the equity disparity is negatively
associated with client recruitment. Collectively, our findings suggest that audit-firm
governance attributes are important determinants of resource allocations in audit
production and, that transparency on audit-firm governance can be informative to existing
and new clients.
Keywords: Audit-firm governance; audit-firm ownership structure; audit effort;
audit-firm transparency; audit production; control-ownership wedge
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The Role of Audit-firm Governance in Audit Production: Evidence from Korea
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is to examine how governance characteristics of public
accounting firms influence audit production. It has been decades since the governance of
audit firms was identified as a research opportunity in auditing, yet the extant literature is
mostly based on theoretical analysis with limited evidence based on proprietary data
(McNair 1991; Narayanan 1995; Lent 1999; Huddart and Liang 2003; Maijoor and
Vanstraelen 2012). Though audit regulators also recognize the importance of audit-firm
governance in driving audit production and ultimately audit quality, there is a paucity of
empirical research on such relationships.28
A key challenge that researchers face in empirically examining the relation between
audit firm governance and resource allocation in audit production is the lack of publicly
available data on audit-firm governance attributes and audit efforts exerted in audit
production. We use hand collected data from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer
System (DART) of South Korea on audit-firm ownership and governance of public
accounting firms to examine how the quantity of audit-firm’s resources are allocated in
audit productions when there is heterogeneity in partners’ abilities. Specifically, we
examine the audit production implications of two audit-firm governance characteristics:
the degree of shirking incentive among partners, measured by within audit firm disparity
in equity holdings of partners, and the delegation of control from non-managing partners
to managing partners, measured by the control-ownership wedge (the percentage of

In the U.S., the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has recognized the role of firmlevel governance and supervision in public accounting firms and calls for research on firm governance and
quality controls in audit firms (PCAOB 2015; PCAOB 2018).
28
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ownership held by non-managing partners).29
While public accounting firms in other jurisdictions are variant in their legal forms,
all public accounting firms in South Korea are partnerships. South Korea is a setting where
we can identify all equity holders of public accounting firms as they are insiders. Prior
research suggests that profit sharing is optimal for the partnership assuming partners are
homogenous in their ability. Gilson and Mnookin (1985) argue that equal sharing of profit
mitigates shirking incentive associated with incentive conflict because partners are both
owners and workers of the firm. Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that the equal profit
sharing is not a necessary but a sufficient condition to align incentives of all partners. The
above two studies implicitly assume that the partners are homogenous within the firm.30
We posit that audit partners face an incentive to shirk in allocation of their effort resources
when risk sharing is proportional to equity distribution among partners, regardless of profitsharing scheme, when there is information asymmetry on quality of partner efforts, ceteris
paribus. Lennox et al. (2020) find that review partners have stronger incentives to monitor
audit quality when they hold larger equity in the firm. This is consistent with the notion
that audit firms with greater variance in individual partner equity holdings are more likely
to suffer from conflicts in varying incentives of individual partners because risk sharing is
based on equity holdings. We hypothesize and test whether firm-wide shirking of audit
partners is associated with the average resource allocation in audit productions of the firm.

In practice, in Korea, not all partners are equity partners. When equity buy in is not available for newly
promoted partners, they establish the relationship with the company by purchasing the bonds issued by the
company and acquire the title of ‘partner’ without buying in to the partnership. The presence of “debt partners”
is somewhat unique to large accounting firms than smaller accounting firms in Korea
3
Huddart and Liang (2005) show that even a partnership of homogenous partners with equal profit sharing
can suffer from shirking when tasks are assigned to partners and there are more than two partners in the firm.
They argue that task specialization is a superior strategy than systematic task assignment where all partners
engage in the same mix of task assignments.
29
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Partnership allows partners to mitigate systematic risk associated with audit
production and other professional services they provide through risk pooling of individual
exposures to systematic risk, and the risk pooling is more effective when partners specialize
(Skogh and Wu 2005; Huddart and Liang 2003; Huddart and Liang 2005). As partners are
not only managers but also mentors in accounting firms (Winograd et al. 2000), the
delegation of control would allow non-managing partners to focus on developing expertise
in specific areas. For example, some partners establish themselves in specific geographic
areas and some partners focus on providing tax-related services but do not provide
assurance services to clients. In partnership, all equity holders are insiders and we identify
all equity holders of audit firms and measure the extent of delegation of control within the
firm when only a subset of partners participate in managing of the firm. On the other hand,
the delegation may create a conflict between managing and non-managing partners of the
firm as the goals of managing partners may not align with those of the firm (Sharma 1997;
Greenwood and Empson 2003). Focusing on the delegation of control as a dimension of
partner resource specialization within the firms, we examine whether and how the
delegation of control influences resource allocation in audit production.
Our sample consists of 168 audit firm-year observations from Korea representing
years 2015 and 2016 and over three thousand client firm-year observations. We document
several key findings. Using equity distribution range as a proxy for equity disparity, we
find that average resource allocation (average quantity audit effort (hours) spent and the
average partner involvement in audit engagements) to audit productions is increasing in
equity disparity as well as the extent of delegation of control. In addition, we find that the
extent of audit-firm delegation of control and greater equity disparity are both positively
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associated with client retention while greater equity disparity is negatively associated with
client recruitment. Overall, our findings suggest that audit-firm governance characteristics
are important determinants of resource allocations in audit production and, transparency
on audit-firm governance can be informative to the Korean capital market.
The contributions of this study are in four areas. First, while prior studies often
assume equal profit sharing and equal risk sharing among partners within the firm, our
results suggest that how varying skills and abilities of partners and unequal risk sharing
among partners are each sufficient conditions to create shirking incentive in audit firms
even in the absence of profit sharing. Second, while prior studies on audit production
mostly focuses on whether and how clients’ audit risk factors are associated with audit
production, to the best of our knowledge, ours is one of the first studies to shed light on
how risk-sharing among partners impact resource allocation decisions in audit production.
Third, our study informs accounting regulators, especially the PCAOB about the potential
informativeness of audit firm transparency reports. This is a timely issue since the U.S.
Department of the Treasury issued a report prepared by the Advisory Committee on the
Auditing Profession urging the PCAOB to mandate the larger auditing firms to produce a
public annual report incorporating information required by the European Union’s Eighth
Directive for Audit Transparency Report beginning in 2010 (USDT 2008). However, this
recommendation has not been adopted by the PCAOB. We believe our findings are relevant
to regulators in jurisdictions that are considering mandating disclosure of audit-firm
transparency reports. Lastly, we contribute to the literature on organizational behavior
specific to partnership governance by providing empirical evidence that partnership
inevitably suffers from shirking of partners when partners are not homogenous, and their
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abilities are not observable (Holmstrom 1982). Using a unique environment where the
quantity of audit effort is observable but not the quality of effort, we document empirical
evidence that partial information asymmetry can lead workers to disguise their effort
quality in exertion of effort resources.31
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II provides institutional
background about the capital market and audit transparency regulation in South Korea.
Section III summarizes related research and develops the hypotheses. Section IV describes
research design and sample selection followed by results in section V. Section VI concludes.
II. AUDIT TRANSPARENCY REGULATION IN KOREA
South Korea is the one of first countries to enact audit transparency disclosure,
requiring the disclosure of audit-firm annual report in 1997.32 The Asian Financial Crisis
in 1996 prompted the regulatory authority to reform the External Audit Act. 33 Public
accounting firms are required to include details of their ownership and governance,
financial positions in financial statements (unaudited), and revenue composition with a list
of public audit clients. The amendment specifies that the goal is to establish a legal basis
for audit-firm disclosure(s) and to institutionalize auditor inspection to improve market
trust in public audit and protect investors (Amendment No. 5196). Specifically, Financial

We regard quality of effort as time unit productivity of effort.
The accounting scandal of Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Corporation in late 2015
triggered the Korean External Audit Act to further scrutinize and regulate auditors. In addition to the
expanded audit requirement for limited liability companies, there is a general guideline provided for audit
hours to be spent on engagements, the audit committee is required to document their expected audit hours
(and the allocation across different ranks of the auditor), and their assessment of audit program adequacy
when the audit report is delivered.
33
In South Korea, the Act on External Audits of Public Companies (hereafter, the External Audit Act) provides
the legal basis for the public audit on listed companies. The Act was revised and retitled in 2018 as “the Act
on External Audits of Public Companies and more”. The revision includes expanded disclosure requirements
and elevated reporting liability of public accounting firms. Also, only registered public accounting firms
satisfying certain criteria will be certified to participate in public audit market.
31
32
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Security Commission (FSC) established the legal basis for the regulatory inspection and
assessment of audit quality; ordered public accounting firms to vest on contingent liability
reserve; initiated mandatory disclosure of audit-firm annual reports;34 and limited auditpartner tenure to six-consecutive fiscal years.35 The amendment calling for the disclosure
of audit-firm annual report was intended to provide the capital market participants with
information to evaluate auditors and audit quality (FSC 1996). In 1998, another regulatory
amendment introduced Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), responsible for monitoring
and regulation of the capital markets as well as inspection of audit engagements and public
accounting firms in Korea.
Also, International Standards on Auditing (ISA) was first adopted in 1999 to further
enhance the quality of public audits. In 2011, Korea adopted International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) followed by the adoption of the clarified ISA (of 2009) in 2012.
Additional disclosure on audit production was mandated in November 2014, effective for
financial statements with year-end on December 2014 and afterwards. Now, all audit
reports on financial statements of public companies are accompanied by an appendix
summarizing audit production information such as the number of CPAs involved, detailed
hours spent by CPAs, and dates and locations of audit fieldwork.
In 2016, the disclosure medium for audit-firm annual reports shifted to the DART,
a comprehensive digital disclosure system supporting the capital markets in Korea. The
change of disclosure medium was to enhance accessibility and comparability of the

If a public accounting firm does not audit a listed company during the fiscal year, the firm is not obligated
to comply with the disclosure requirement for the corresponding fiscal year.
35
The mandatory auditor rotation came back in 2003 and became effective in 2006, requiring mandatory audit
firm rotation after six years of consecutive audit engagements and was abolished in 2009. Starting 2020, the
mandatory rotation is returning with some modification; public companies can engage an external auditor for
six years followed by three years of auditor designation by the regulator.
34
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disclosure (FSS 2015), and the change is expected to improve the visibility of audit-firm
annual reports and draw public attention on organizational details and the performance of
public accounting firms.36 Since then, audit-firm annual reports also disclose information
on on-going litigations and the estimated contingent liability along with the amount of cash
vested for liability losses. Also, the report provides general information about the audit
firm’s affiliation, internal control and monitoring, ethical principles and training, client
relation management, and professional resources available at the firm.
III. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Determinants of Audit Production
Prior studies in audit production literature have mainly focused on how different
attributes of audit client and auditor attributes are associated with the quantity of effort
used in audit production, and how audit production characteristics are associated with audit
quality. O’Keefe et al. (1994) defines audit production problem as a cost minimization
problem subject to maintaining minimum audit quality. Total effort used in audit production
is a function of audit risk factors, which requires certain level of audit effort, and audit
quality is a function of audit effort and risk level. One stream of audit production literature
investigates factors of audit production. 37 Those studies examine how client characteristics
affect allocation of effort in audit production while some other studies examine whether
and how auditor characteristics are associated with effort used in audit production, yet they
mostly focus on client-dependent characteristics, such as auditor independence (Davis et

Even though audit-firm annual reports were available online from the FSS starting in 2003, those reports
consisted of mostly compressed picture files and investors’ awareness was rather limited due to unreliable
reporting quality and lower accessibility.
37
The other prominent steam in the audit production literature is production efficiency (Banker et al. 2003;
Dopuch et al. 2003; and Knechel et al. 2009).
36
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al. 1993; Bell et al. 1994; O’Keefe et al. 1994). Davis et al. (1993) and Bell et al. (1994)
report that client size is positively associated with the total audit effort and show that lowerrank auditors’ hours increase more rapidly than that of higher-rank auditors with increase
in client size. O’Keefe et al. (1994) report that client characteristics, such as size,
complexity, leverage and risk measures are significantly associated with cross-sectional
variation in audit hours spent by differently ranked auditors in audit production.
Schelleman and Knechel (2010) also report that the client size and risk level are
determinants of total audit hours and audit hours spent by each rank of auditors for all ranks.
They also report that client size, the number of reports issued, and the number of client
locations are associated with the total audit hours. Using Korean data, Kwon et al. (2014)
also document that client size and risk level are determinants of audit effort.
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) note that audit firm size is an important determinant
of audit hours and report a positive association between auditor size and total hours, but
Blokdijk et al. (2006) report no effect of auditor size on audit effort. Using non-audit
services as a measure of client-dependent auditor characteristic, Davis et al. (1993)
examine the presence of knowledge spillover of auditor-provided non-audit services on
audit production and report positive association between tax-related non-audit services fees
and the quantity of effort used in audit production. They also report a positive association
between non-audit service fees and audit fee, arguing that the higher audit fees paid by
companies that also purchase high non-audit services may be driven by additional effort
used in audit production. However, O’Keefe et al. (1994) report no significant association
between tax and management consulting services and audit hours spent by differently
ranked auditors. Kwon et al. (2014) show that regulatory pressure may be a determinant of
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audit effort used in audit production. Using Korean data from a period when mandatory
audit firm rotation was required, they find that audit-firm changes are associated with
significant increase in audit effort in the mandatory rotation period in comparison to the
pre-rotation period.
While the quantity of effort is mainly used to address effort in audit
production in prior research, we posit that effort is a product of quantity and unit
productivity of effort. In this regard, O’Keefe et al. (1994) note that using total audit hours
as a proxy of audit effort may result in information loss about effort in audit production, as
hours spent by junior auditors produce different output to the same hours spent by senior
auditors, and Causholli et al. (2010) also define audit effort as a function of both the type
of labor and time expended. Partners’ efforts and abilities not only impact audit production,
but also impact business development (recruitment and retention of clients), and other
decision qualities (Huddart and Liang 2005; Knechel et al. 2013). A more competent audit
partner is likely to have higher unit productivity of effort as she is more able to effectively
supervise subordinates in audit productions than a less competent partner. Accordingly,
more competent auditors should be able to minimize the total quantity of effort in audit
production, as the minimum quantity of effort to maintain adequate audit quality is
inversely proportional to the unit productivity of partner effort, ceteris paribus.
Partner Risk Sharing and Resource Allocation in Audit Production
Audit firms are profit seeking firms that provide public audit service to the market.
Most audit firms are partnerships, and it allows participating partners to maximize profit
per partner by alleviating the systematic risk cost associated with audit production (Gilson
and Mnookin 1985; Levin and Tadelis 2005). Uneven profit sharing fails to fully mitigate
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systematic risk associated with partnership and exposes partners to systematic risk when
partners are homogenous (Gilson and Mnookin 1985; Farrell and Scotchmer 1988).38 In
this regard, Huddart and Liang (2005) show that smaller firms are better off with
performance-based profit sharing rather than equal profit sharing when partners are
homogenous. However, partners generally have different experience and are equipped with
different skill sets. When partners are heterogenous, the equal profit sharing is not the first
best solution.39 Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) and Sherstyuk (1998) show that partnerships
can be stable with equal profit sharing even when partners have different abilities, but they
also show that a partnership of equal profit sharing with heterogenous partners would be
inefficient and suboptimal to a partnership structure without equal profit sharing.40
We acknowledge that partners’ abilities vary in practice and examine whether and
how equity distribution among partners is associated with partner effort shirking in audit
production, regardless of profit-sharing scheme of the firm, because risk sharing is
proportional to equity holding of partners. There are two approaches to profit sharing in a
partnership depending on profit sharing scheme adopted by the firm (Knechel et al. 2013):
equal-sharing based on partner equity holding regardless of partner performance or
performance-based sharing in which partners are paid based on their performance. With
equal profit sharing among partners, the profit allocated to partner k with respect to audit

In contrary, Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that a partnership is a team in which all members are residual
claimants, although their profit shares do not have to be equal. They argue that shame, guilt, norms, and
empathy can operate to create incentives in the firm in addition to profit-sharing, and that partnership can
still operate efficiently under uneven profit-sharing.
39
Sherstyuk (1998) show that there is a stable partnership size for heterogenous partners with equal profit
sharing, yet suboptimal to a structure without equal profit-sharing constraint.
40
Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) show that the optimal size of partnership is restricted when partners are
different in terms of their available labor input (i.e., working hours per day) while Sherstyuk (1998) show
that the optimal size of partnership is also restricted when partners have different abilities (i.e., unit
productivity of hourly effort varies).
38
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in accounting firm i in year t would be: UEt (k) = ProfitEit(k) = wi(k, t) ×Ut(i) = wi(k,
t)×{Revenuet(i) – Costt(i)}, where wi(k, t) denotes the percentage equity of audit firm i held
by partner k in year t. Revenuejt is the total audit fees and reputation earned by firm i in year
N

𝑘
t, or Σ𝑘=1
Revenuet(k) + ΔReputationt(i), and Costt(i) is the total audit costs incurred and

N

𝑘
assumed by firm i in year t, or Σ𝑘=1
Costt(k)41. With performance-based sharing among

partners, each partner will be compensated with what they have earned, without sharing
the revenue and direct cost of productions, that the utility of partner k in accounting firm i
in year t would be: UPt(k) = ProfitPt(k) = Revenuet(k) – Costt(k). Under the performancebased compensation, partners do not share their revenue within the firm and bear the full
cost with audit productions supervised by themselves, so the profit allocated to partner k in
accounting firm i in year t would be: Profitit(k) = {Unit pricet(i) × Quantity effortt(k) + wi(k,
t) × ΔReputationt(i)}– {Unit productivityit(k) 42 × Quantity effortit(k) + wi(k, t) ×
E(Contingent liabilityt(i)43}, ceteris paribus. Partners always benefit from the partnership
even if their individual exposure to risk varies without the partnership because of audit firm
reputation (Skogh and Wu 2005).
However, shirking incentive exists for partners holding smaller shares of equity

Nk denotes the total number of partners in firm i. For partner k in firm i in fiscal year t, we assume:
N𝑘
Σ𝑘=1
Costkt = Costit.
In practice, partners also benefit from sharing of common overhead cost in partnership:
N𝑘
N𝑘
Σ𝑘=1
Ut (k) < Ut (i) because Σ𝑘=1
Costkt > Costit.
42
The unit cost of effort would be greater for partners with more skills and abilities because more competent
partners should be priced higher in the market; unit cost of effort is a positive function of unit productivity
of partner.
43
Contingent liability captures the cost of audit failure; when an audit failure is identified after the audit
production, auditor is subject to litigation. Expected contingent liability estimates the cost of audit failure as
a product of P(audit failure) and the amount of liability damage that the auditor will have to compensate
when there is an audit failure. We assume that Pi(audit failure) is always smaller than Pk(audit failure) because
of economics of scale and pooling of systematic risk associated with audit production in different client
industries. Therefore, for partner k in audit firm i in fiscal year t, we assume E(Contingent liabilityit) ≤
N𝑘
Σ𝑘=1
E(Contingent liabilitykt). Nk denotes the total number of partners in firm i.
41
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than their contribution of resource effort to firm’s output would be exposed to shirking
incentive (Kandel and Lazear 1992; Lennox and Wu 2018).44 Huddart and Liang (2005)
argue that for accounting firms with smaller number of partners, performance-based
compensation would be more optimal than the profit-sharing compensation because of the
potential cost of monitoring associated with shirking of partners. We note that the unit cost
of effort per partner varies within the firm when risk-sharing among partners is not uneven.
If wit(k) is not identical for all kn = {1, …, Nk} where there are Nk partners in audit firm i,
it is true that for some partners, wit(k) ≠

1
N𝑘

N

𝑘
Σ𝑘=1
wit(k). When wi(k, t) is not consistent

function of partners ability or partner unit productivity, the sorting of partners in firm i by
their unit cost of effort is inconsistent with the sorting of partners by their profit level. This
inconsistency creates shirking incentive for partners with wit(k) ≠

1
N𝑘

N

𝑘
Σ𝑘=1
wit(k), regardless

of profit-sharing scheme of the firm. Unfortunately, this shirking problem is always costly
in partnership (Kaya and Vereshchagina 2014) because individual partner’s unit
productivity of effort is not fully observable and the sufficient level of quantity effortikt to
maintain audit quality is a function of partner unit productivity.45 Thus, one unanswered
question is how the aggregated shirking incentive among partners of audit firm translates
to average resource allocation in audit productions of the firm.
When efforts are fully observable and thus profit sharing is transparent, the problem

Lennox et al. (2020) find that review partners have stronger incentives to monitor audit quality when they
hold larger equity in the firm, supported by a positive association between review-partner equity ownership
and audit adjustments.
45
The unit cost of effort is greater when a partner holding of equity is greater, holding the quantity effort per
partner is constant, ceteris paribus. The unit cost of effort assumed by partner k in firm i in fiscal year t is:
Unit cost of effortit(k) = (Unit productivityt(k)) + wkt × E(Contingent liabilityt(i))
(Quantity effortit(k))
That is, holding the quantity effort per partner is constant, the total cost of effort varies among partners even
when partners are homogenous in terms of their ability, Unit productivityt(k) is constant for kn = {1, …, Nk}
in audit firm i when their equity holdings are heterogenous.
44
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of partner shirking does not exist ex post even with uneven profit-sharing (Gilson and
Mnookin 1985). However, when wi(k, t) is not a function of partner ability or partner unit
productivity, shirking exists regardless of profit-sharing scheme of the firm. Let’s assume
that partners’ available effort resources in quantity are homogenous 46 , but that unit
productivity of effort varies among partners.47 When only quantity of effort is observable—
with unobservable unit productivity of effort—peer monitoring should be set to ensure that
all available resources of partners as workers are spent for the firm, and the effort spent is
sufficient to maintain adequate quality of service. However, when information on partner
effort is not symmetric that the effort quality is not observable, firms inevitably suffer from
the risk of partners shirking their efforts (Holmstrom 1982). Assuming resources are fully
allocated, shirking incentive is associated with either impairment of audit quality or
inefficient use of scarce partner labor resources, because partners efforts are not only
exerted in audit production, but also in business development associated with the number
of audit engagements (Knechel et al. 2013). Shirking partners can disguise their unit
productivity as higher than the actual and allocate less than the minimum quantity of effort
for adequate audit quality in audit productions, so that they can engage in as many audit
engagements as possible to maximize their profit, ceteris paribus. This is a classic shirking
problem of lower effort, yet the business development aspect of shirking may not exist with
the absence of full resource allocation constraint. Further, shirking partners can disguise
their unit productivity as lower than the actual to maximize the quantity effort allocated to

A partner with 30 percent equity holding does not have a day twice longer than a partner with 15 percent
equity holding.
47
Each hour spent by a more-able partner inputs greater effort than each hour spent by a less-able partner in
audit production. Though partners are competent professionals, the degree of competence can vary depending
on experience and skillset.
46
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engagements and minimize the number of engagements given the limited quantity of effort.
While this type of shirking behavior sounds counterintuitive, it is possible because the
choice of shirking behavior depends on individual preferences. For example, partners
assigned to sales and business development activities may engage in this type of shirking
behavior to maximize individual utility, ceteris paribus. Also, partners who enjoy the
fieldwork and interactions in client locations would pursue this type of shirking behavior,
if any. 48 Since unit productivity is not observable, peer monitoring would not be fully
effective in mitigating shirking behaviors. If the average unit productivity is used to
determine the required minimum quantity of effort for screening of shirking behavior,
shirking partners with below-average unit productivity are not suspected.49
Given opposing possibilities of shirking behaviors in resource allocation in audit
production, we propose the following hypotheses on the relation between shirking
incentive and resource allocation in audit production:
H1a: Ownership disparity among audit partners is negatively associated with the
average quantity of audit effort and average partner involvement in audit
production.
H1b: Ownership disparity among audit partners is positively associated with the average
quantity of audit effort and average partner involvement in audit production.

Informal conversations with audit partners in Korea suggest that partners using excessive resources in audit
production for the sake of personal and professional satisfaction, though those partner resources could be
used elsewhere for better monetary return.
49
Kaya and Vereshchagina (2014) views partnership as a teamwork of partners to exploit technological
complementarities with the cost of moral hazard problem or risk of free riders. They show that the cost of
moral hazard is smaller when all partners are the same type (with same level of unit productivity of effort)
than when partners are different in type (with variance in their unit productivity of effort). According to their
model, partnership suffers less from the cost of moral hazard when all partners have low unit productivity of
effort than when the partnership is composed of partners with high and low unit productivities of effort.
Consistently, Landers et al. (1996) show that team production and profit-sharing features of partnership (law
firm) lead to firm’s promotion system to filter out partners with similar abilities (of working longer hours).
48
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Delegation of Control and Partner Resource Allocation in Audit Production
While a partnership is generally thought of as an organization where there is risksharing and collective decision-making among all partners of the firm, in practice, it is hard
to find a firm where the equity is evenly distributed among partners and the degree of risk
sharing varies among audit firms as equity distribution is often unique to each firm.
Since partners are not only owners but also workers of the firm, incorporation of
partnership can be regarded as a creation of portfolio, full of partner assets. By combining
different assets (individual partners) into a portfolio (a partnership), investors (partners)
can reduce the level of aggregated risk without reducing expected total return (Gilson and
Mnookin 1985). Partnership allows partners to mitigate systematic risk associated with
public audit and other professional services they provide through risk pooling of individual
exposures to systematic risk, and the risk pooling is more effective when partners are
specialized, and the types of pooled assets are more diverse (Skogh and Wu 2005; Huddart
and Liang 2003; Huddart and Liang 2005).
In practice, not all partners of public accounting firms are actively involved in
management of the firm. This delegation of control rights creates a setting where equityholding partners delegate their management responsibility to a subgroup of partners
(managing partners). This delegation of control is often a strategic choice of the firm; when
partners have comparative advantage in different tasks, the delegation allows the firm to
be more strategically positioned in the market; Huddart and Liang (2005) show that the
systematic partner task assignment is optimal for two-person partnership but invites
shirking in larger partnerships. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), it is time consuming
for all partners to remain informed about all administrative matters as individual partners
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may have insufficient experience and the necessary knowledge to make informed
contributions to firm’s management. As partners are key instructors in knowledge
management within the firm (Winograd et al. 2000), the strategic and efficient allocation
of partner resources through specialization allows non-managing partners to better use their
time in communicating with their subordinates, triggering effective knowledge transfer
within the firm.50 Consistently, Huddart and Liang (2005) argue that the gains from partner
specialization is attributed to the gains from improved partner incentives to develop and
maintain their specialization rather than from economies of scale. As we acknowledge that
partners are not identical in their ability and contributions to the firm, it would be optimal
for the firm to strategically delegate the managing role to a subset of partners to (1) better
mitigate the systematic risks pooled from individual partners and (2) let other partners
focus on providing professional services in their specialized areas to allow the firm to
operate more efficiently.51
Agency theory focuses on the costs associated with structuring, monitoring and
enforcing contracts in principal-agent relationships, due to likely inconsistencies in the
interests of the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt 1989). There is extensive prior research
on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms as well as compensation

Partner specialization is associated with improved skills and abilities of partners, which translates into
higher unit productivity of effort. Also, since Pk(audit failure) is a function of partner quality, holding quantity
effort constant, the unit contingent liability cost of effort for partner ks in specialized audit firm is would be
smaller than the unit contingent liability cost of effort for partner kN in non-specialized audit firm iN, where
the unit contingent liability cost of effort for partner k of firm i in year t is (wit(k)× E(Contingent liabilityit)/
(Quantity effortit(k)), where wit(k) is the percent equity of audit firm i held by partner k in year t.
51
Moreover, firms often need efficient use of specialized knowledge from non-partner members. Non-partner
members of the firm would be more willing to share the knowledge as he/she is more bonded with the firm,
and one prominent incentive for the knowledge sharing would be potential future promotion to partner (Lent
1999). When such promotion is used as an incentive to cultivate non-partners members’ loyalty to the firm,
it is more often that the junior partners get a minimal stake of equity to gain the partner status with a promise
of delegating the control right to pre-determined subset of managing partners. In this regard, firms with active
knowledge sharing from partners as well as non-partner members would ex post exhibit greater extent of
delegation of control in firm governance.
50

104

structures in reducing the external agency problem associated with the ownership and
control of public companies (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). For
partnerships, the ownership distribution is limited among partners who are insiders of
company, and the delegation of control creates an agency relationship between managing
and non-managing partners of the firm; Greenwood and Empson (2003) refer to the agency
costs associated with the separation of ownership and control as external agency costs, in
contrast with internal agency costs associated with agency relationship among insiders of
the company.
In accounting partnerships, the delegation of control is not necessarily voluntary;
senior managers are allowed to buy in a minimal equity stake when promoted as a junior
partner, and junior partners do not necessarily have an option but to delegate the control to
the pre-existing management team. Greenwood and Empson (2003) state, “the goals of
some partners can differ from the goals of broader partners depending on their roles,”
because, for example, senior partners often have a shorter incentive horizon than junior
partners. Greenwood and Empson (2003) also state, “greater heterogeneity strains
collegiality and the willingness to cooperate” among partners, supporting the idea of
partner heterogeneity exacerbates internal agency costs associated with goal divergence
and moral hazard problem among partners. However, since all partners of audit firm are
professionals aiming for quality service, it is unlikely that the delegation alone creates
incentive misalignment between managing and non-managing partners of the firm; the
agency relationship is only a necessary condition for agency costs to occur, and the extent
of delegation does not necessarily represent the extent of incentive conflict.
If the extent of managerial delegation proxies for the extent of partner resource
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specialization, audit partners from firms with a high degree of managerial delegation
should be able to allocate more of their efforts in audit production compared to audit
partners from firms with less or no managerial delegation among partners. When partners
are more specialized and able to focus on audit production, they may allocate greater effort
in audit production or have a higher bar for audit quality. Accordingly, we predict that the
extent of managerial delegation in accounting partnership is positively associated with
partner involvement and auditor effort used in audit production and propose the following
hypotheses52:
H2a: The extent of managerial delegation is positively associated with the average audit
partner involvement in audit production.
H2b: The extent of managerial delegation is positively associated with the average use
of auditor resources in audit production.53
IV. EMPIRICAL MODELS AND SAMPLE
Measures of Audit-firm Governance
To measure the extent of disparity in risk sharing among partners of audit firm i in
year t (EQDISP), we assume that the percentage equity holding of partner k is the
percentage profit for the partner, proxying for the extent of disparity in risk sharing. To
measure EQDISPit we compute the range of partner equity holdings for each audit firm i
in year t.54 EQDISPit would have a value of 0 if the equity stake is evenly distributed among

As we are interested in whether and how audit-firm governance characteristics are associated with audit
production, our unit of analysis is the audit firm. To estimate for the associations, we use client-level
observations of audit productions to estimate the average firm audit production characteristics and whether
and how the average audit production characteristics vary with audit-firm governance characteristics.
53
We are interested in auditor effort observable as the hours spent by CPAs in audit production, excluding
hours spent by external specialists, such as IT specialists or certified appraisers.
54
For example, if two partners hold 20 percent of the equity respectively, we know that the remaining 60
percent of equity stake is distributed among other partners. Let’s consider two possible cases: the remaining
60 percent equity is evenly held by 10 other partners, or the remaining 60 percent equity is evenly held by 22
other partners. In the first case, there are total twelve partners in the firm. If audit engagements are evenly
conducted by all partners, In the first case, the percentage liability risk assumed by the dominant partner is
52
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partners; if there is no difference in maximum partner equity holding and the minimum
partner equity holding, all partners would share identical liability risk of the firm. If auditfirm i has six partners in year t where one partner holds 50 percent of equity and other five
partners hold 10 percent each, then EQDISPit would be 0.4 (0.5 – 0.1).
To measure the extent of managerial delegation, we estimate control-ownership
wedge (CONWEDGE) for each audit-firm-year (i, t) observation. Using the list of equity
partners disclosed in audit-firm annual reports, we code whether each partner is involved
in the management based on the title (and the role) disclosed.55 Based on the coding, we
estimate the control-ownership wedge as the proportion of ownership held by nonmanaging partners at firm-level. CONWEDGE would equal 0 if all equity partners are
involved in managing the firm. If audit-firm management is delegated to a single partner
with 10 percent of ownership, then CONWEDGEit of audit firm i in year t equals 0.9 (1 0.10).
Measures of Audit Production
We measure audit production in two ways: total audit effort spent on an engagement
and the engagement partners’ involvement in the production. Total auditor effort is
measured as the log transformation of total hours spent by auditor i for client j in year t

more than three times of that assumed by a non-dominant partner holding 6 percent of equity stake (20 percent
/ 6 percent = 3.33). However, in the second case, there are total 24 partners in the firm, the liability risk
assumed by the dominant partner is more than seven times of that assumed by a non-dominant partner holding
2.727 percent of equity stake (20 percent / 2.727 percent = 7.33); as the equity is less uniformly distributed,
and shirking incentive for non-dominant partners would be greater in the second case. Also, 10 out of 12 (83
percent) partners face the shirking incentive in the first case while 22 out of 24 (92 percent) partners face the
shirking incentive in the second case, and aggregated shirking incentive existing in the second case would be
much larger than the first case. If Herfindahl concentration index is calculated for the two cases, the first case
would yield higher index value than the second case. However, range of equity distribution would linearly
represent the extent of equity disparity associated with shirking incentive among risk-sharing partners.
55
For example, partners with titles related to the CEO, office management, administrative management,
internal quality control and controllership are coded as involved in the management. Titles are inconsistently
disclosed across firms, and we acknowledge that our measure is not free from measurement error; few firms
report only the business units of each partner and in this case, only the CEO is coded as a managing partner.
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(EFFORTijt), and the partner involvement in audit is measured as the relative size of partner
hours spent to total audit hours spent in audit production by auditor i for client j in year t
(PEFFORTijt).
Empirical Models
We test the hypotheses using the two measures of equity disparity (EQDISPit) and
delegation of control (CONWEDGEit) by examining their associations with firm-specific
characteristics in audit production. The associations can be documented as:
Y1ijt = β0 + β1(X1it) + β2(X2it) + ΣControls + ε1

(1)

Y2ijt = γ0 + γ1(X1it) + γ2(X2it) + ΣControls + ε 2
where Y1, Y2, X1 and X2 refer to EFFORT, PEFFORT, EQDISP and CONWEDGE, and
subscripts i, j, and t denote audit firm, client engagement, and fiscal year respectively.
Though we are interested in the associations between audit-firm governance attributes and
audit effort, it is important to address that the audit production decisions are not
independently, but rather, simultaneously determined. As EFFORTijt is ln(x) while
PEFFORTijt is a⁄x where x and a are the hours spent by all auditors and partners respectively,
PEFFORTijt is a linear function of EFFORTijt. 56 Also, the single-equation models may
concurrently suffer from an omitted variable bias due to unknown omitted variables
correlated with EFFORTijt and PEFFORTijt, causing the regression residuals of singleequation models to be correlated. In fact, when equation (1) is independently estimated for
each dependent variable, we find correlated regression residuals. To address this bias, we
simultaneously estimate the two equations and compute 3SLS estimates with instrumental
variables:

56

Hausman test shows that PEFFORT is endogenous to EFFORT.
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Y1ijt = β0 + β1(X1it) + β2(X2it) + β3(IV1it) + ΣControls + ε1

(2)

Y2ijt = γ0 + γ1(X1it) + γ2(X2it) + γ3(Ŷ1ijt) + γ4(IV2it) + γ5(IV3it) + ΣControls + ε 2
where Y1, Y2, X1 and X2 refer to EFFORT, PEFFORT, EQDISP, and CONWEDGE, and
subscripts i, j, and t denote audit firm, client engagement and fiscal year respectively. To
estimate the system of equations simultaneously, three instrumental variables are defined
to address the correlation among unexplained variances in dependent variables if each
equation in the system is estimated separately. For instrumental variables to be valid, IV1it
needs to be strongly correlated with regression residual of equation (1) with EFFORTijt as
a dependent variable, while exhibiting no significant correlation with regression residual
of equation (1) with PEFFORTijt variable, and vice versa for IV2it and IV3it.57 CCRATIOit,
the first instrumental variable (IV1it) is the number of CPA resources available divided by
the number of audit clients engaged by the firm i in year t. The two instrumental variables
included in the second equation of the system are PCRATIOit and FIRMRATIOit, each
measured as the number of partners divided by the number of clients and the number of
partners divided by the number of CPA resources at the firm, respectively. The two
instruments proxy for the partner resource availability at the firm regardless of corporate
governance and is conceptually independent to EFFORTijt.
We expect the coefficients on both test variables to be positive and significant (H1:
β2, γ2 > 0 or β2, γ2 < 0, H2a: β1 > 0, H2b: γ1 > 0). As our test variables are audit-firm-specific
while dependent variables are engagement-specific, the estimates of coefficients of test
variables (β1 , β2, γ1, γ2) will depict the associations between firm-specific governance

We perform the exclusion restriction test by estimating whether instrumental variables are correlated with
the residual of the other equation in the system and find that IV1it is not correlated with ε2 and IV2it and IV3it
are not correlated with ε1. Instruments affect the other dependent variable only indirectly, through their
correlations with the included endogenous variables.
57

109

attributes (Xit) and expected values of dependent variables at audit firm level (Yij̄ t), with
firm-specific and engagement-specific control variables controlling for the variances in
dependent variables associated with other audit-firm and individual engagement
characteristics respectively.
As we are using engagement-level observations to estimate for the associations
between audit-firm governance characteristics and average resource allocation in audit
productions of firms, it is important that we have a sufficient number of client observations
available to estimate the average resource allocation decisions in audit productions. That
is, the error variances in firm-specific average audit resource allocation levels are larger if
fewer number of audit production observations are available. Therefore, we compute
weighted least squares estimates using the natural log of audit production observations used
per audit firm i and year t as weights.
We include several control variables representing other auditor attributes and client
characteristic associated with resource allocation decision in audit production. While the
literature often uses audit fee (FEE) as a proxy of audit effort, we control for the effect of
total audit fee on audit production. According to the audit production model (O’Keefe et
al. 1994), auditors’ objective is to maximize profit from a given budget by minimizing audit
cost while maintaining an adequate level of audit quality, thus we predict a positive relation
between FEE and effort. Also, auditors are generally less familiar with new clients and new
engagements often require additional first-year procedures on audit risk assessment.
Accordingly, we include a dichotomous variable (NEW) indicating a new client (Elliott et
al. 2013). We control for audit firm size (BIG) following DeAngelo (1981), as the size of
audit firm proxies for firm-level economies of scale which affects production efficiency.
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Also, audit firms affiliated with a global network are not only larger, but also benefit from
knowledge sharing and international auditing fieldwork experience (Carson 2009). Thus,
we include a control variable indicating audit firm’s affiliation to global network
(AFFILIATE). Further, we include the number of offices (OFFICE), though the number of
offices is not a good measure of audit-firm size in Korean context; most firms have a single
main office and the offices are not necessarily dispersed in geography. We believe the
number of offices indicates the resource sharing flexibility within the firm, as the resources
are spread among different locations. We include years of experience in public audit
(EXPERIENCE) to proxy for the firm-level economies of scale in audit production. We
also control for important clients (IMPORTANCE) since auditors may devote greater effort
for important clients relative to other clients. Prior research documents that non-audit
service fees paid to auditors suggest potential auditor independence impairment (Lisic et
al. 2018) or the knowledge spillover effect from auditor-provided non-audit services
(Krishnan and Visvanathan 2011). We include the total non-audit services fees to control
for client demand for accounting-related services (NAS). To control for other client
characteristics affecting resource allocation decisions in audit production, we include
variables measuring client attributes associated with audit risk assessments (O’Keefe et al.
1994; Knechel et al. 2009). We include innate factors associated with earnings quality such
as size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MB), the number of employees (EMPLOYEE),
operating cash flows (OCF), incidence of losses (LOSS), leverage (LEV), and asset
liquidity (INVREC) (Gebhardt et al. 2001; Francis et al. 2004). We also include client-level
governance characteristics such as the largest shareholder ownership (OWN), size of the
board (BOD), as the auditor assessment of earnings manipulation risk reflects corporate
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governance risk (Bedard and Johnstone 2004). See Appendix 1.A for definitions of all the
variables used in this study.
Sample
In South Korea, most audit firms have fiscal year-end in March and audit-firm
annual reports are generally available by the end of June. Therefore, audit-firm annual
reports disclosed in calendar year 2016 corresponds to audit engagements on December
year-end clients’ financial statements of fiscal year 2015. We limit our sample to FY2015
and FY2016, because audit-firm annual reports disclosed prior to 2016 are set aside from
the regular capital-market disclosure system and are less accessible with lower
comparability. Audit-firm specific variables are collected from the audit-firm’s annual
reports. As indicated in Table 3.1, there are 157 and 164 registered public accounting firms
disclosing their annual reports in 2016 and 2017, respectively. These firms offer public
audit services as one of their business areas, regardless of whether they currently have a
public client or not. Of the 321 firm-year observations (Ni), 220 firm-year observations
have executed at least one public audit engagement during the sample period but only 168
firm-year observations survive in the final sample with sufficient audit production details
for estimation of firm-specific audit quality. For 220 audit-firm year observations, there are
over 3,600 audit engagements with manufacturing firms listed in the Korea Stock
Exchange (KRX) and we have 3,118 audit engagement observations for which sufficient
data are available to estimate our models. The final audit production observations have
received audit opinions from 79 auditors for their financial statements of FY2015 and from
89 auditors in FY2016 (ni =168).
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Table 3.1 Sample Selection
Panel A. Audit-firm sample
Registered public accounting firms in 2015
Registered public accounting firms in 2016
All registered public accounting firms in 2015-2016
(less) observations with no public clients
Audit firm-year observations with at least one public audit engagement
(less) observations with incomplete audit engagement detail
Audit firm-year observations in the final sample

157
164
321
(101)
220
(52)
168

Panel B. Audit production sample
Firm-year observations of manufacturing companies in KRX for 2015-2016
3,616
(less) firm-year observations missing audit-firm information
(83)
(less) firm-year observations with insufficient financial statement variables
(265)
(less) firm-year observations with insufficient governance and capital market variables
(150)
Engagement-year observations in the final sample

3,118

V. RESULTS
Univariate Analyses
Summary statistics on variables used in the study are presented in Table 3.2. On
average, audit-firms have about 21 public audit productions (engagements) (PUBLICit) and
the average total audit production is 227 engagements—for both private and public clients
(CLIENTSit). About 61.2 percent of equity are held by non-managing partners
(CONWEDGEit), where there are firms with full-partner participation in the management
(e.g. each partner is responsible for managing of an office) or with a CEO-partner with
0.0001 percent of equity holding and others with non-admirative titles. 58 The average
equity disparity of sample audit firms, measured as the range of equity holdings is 0.241
while some firms have an evenly distributed equity among partners; min(EQDISPit) = 0.

In this case, the annual report also disclosed the names of administrative responsibility (e.g. preparation of
annual reports and the head of quality control), but those names were not found in the list of equity partners.
58

113

1
An average audit-firm has about six audit engagements per partner per year (E(𝑃𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂
).
)
𝑖𝑡

The partner to CPA ratio (FIRMRATIOit) is 0.497 indicating that an average firm has about
2 CPAs for every partner in an audit-firm, and about three offices (OFFICEit). 59 The
average CPA to audit engagements ratio (CCRATIOit) is 0.399. Of 168 sample firm-year
observations of public accounting firms, there are eight BigN observations with 35.7
percent of firms affiliated with a global network (AFFILIATEit). With respect to firmspecific characteristics in audit production, about 19.6 percent of audit engagements are
first-year audits (NEWijt). Sample audit- firms have spent about an average of 734 (= e6.598)
CPA-hours60 on audit engagements, where an average audit-firm has about 20.4 percent of
partner involvement in audit production.
Pearson correlation coefficients between variables are estimated at audit-firm level
(engagement-level variables are averaged per audit-firm per fiscal year) and are in Table
3.3. The correlations between the control-ownership wedge (CONWEDGEit) and equity
range (EQDISPit) is -0.490 (p-value < 0.001), suggesting that the delegation of control is
more likely for firms when the ownership heterogeneity is smaller.61 We find no direct
correlation between these two test variables and average CPA hours spent on audit
engagements conducted by the same firm, but there is a significantly positive direct
correlation (0.338, p-value < 0.001) between CONWEDGEit and PEFFORTij̄ t, suggesting
that the delegation of control is positively associated with average partner involvement in
audit production.

Among the Big four, Samjung-KPMG has three offices (including one satellite office), Samil_PwC has
three offices, EY has two offices and Anjin-Deloitte has one office.
60
This statistic does not account for client-specific audit risk factors like client size and complexity, nor
auditor effect on client selection e.g., larger clients are more likely to choose a larger auditor who has an
adequate capacity.
61
The magnitude of correlation coefficient (< 0.6) does not suggest serious multicollinearity.
59
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics

(nij̄ t = 168)

PUBLICit

Mean
21.393

Std.
49.941

Min
2

Median
6

CLIENTSit

227.274

297.314

2

CONWEDGEit

0.612

0.293

0

0.691

0.999

EQDISPit

0.241

0.231

0

0.160

0.994

PCRATIOit

0.166

0.343

0.017

0.130

4.5

CCRATIOit

0.399

0.819

0.057

0.268

10.5

FIRMRATIOit

0.497

0.220

0.064

0.489

1

BIGit

0.048

0.214

0

0

1

AFFILIATEit
EXPERIENCEi

0.357

0.481

0

0

1

13.030

8.332

0

12

46

OFFICEit

2.923

2.543

1

2

21

EFFORTij̄ t

6.598

0.281

5.663

6.566

7.447

PEFFORTij̄ t

0.204

0.099

0.033

0.209

0.559

FEEij̄ t

10.996

0.273

9.648

10.971

11.826

NASij̄ t

2.545

2.399

0

2.074

9.843

NEWij̄ t
IMPORTANCE

0.196

0.220

0

0.159

1

0.003

0.002

0.000

0.002

0.011

SIZEij̄ t

18.424

0.566

16.906

18.428

19.886

MBij̄ t

2.183

1.513

0.166

1.885

15.145

EMPLOYEEij̄ t

4.974

0.631

2.303

4.976

7.106

OCFij̄ t

0.029

0.062

-0.365

0.037

0.208

LEVij̄ t

0.401

0.104

0.091

0.407

0.855

LOSSij̄ t

0.311

0.246

0

0.311

1

OWNij̄ t

36.093

10.451

BODij̄ t

3.370

0.750

INVRECij̄ t

0.286

0.082

129.5

Max
322
1769

t

ij̄ t

6.950

35.540

65.715

1.5

3.327

8.5

0.107

0.278

0.890

This table presents descriptive statistics of audit-firm-specific variables and client-specific variables averaged
per audit firm year. Client-specific variables are averages of audit firm i’s manufacturing clients (j̄) listed in
Korea Exchange (KRX) in fiscal year t. Audit-firm level variables are collected from audit-firm annual
reports disclosed in calendar years of 2016 and 2017, and those are corresponding to client-year observations
with fiscal years of 2015 and 2016. Public engagement details are collected from annual reports of public
companies disclosed in calendar years of 2016 and 2017, corresponding to FY2015 and 2016. See Appendix
3.A for variable definitions.
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Table 3.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients
CONWEDGEit
EQDISPit
EFFORTij̄ t
PEFFORTij̄ t
FEEij̄ t
NASij̄ t
NEWij̄ t
BIGit
AFFILIATEit
OFFICEit
EXPERIENCEit
IMPORTANCEij̄ t
SIZEij̄ t
MBij̄ t
EMPLOYEEij̄ t
OCFij̄ t
LEVij̄ t
LOSSij̄ t
OWNij̄ t
BODij̄ t
INVRECij̄ t
PCRATIOit
CCRATIOit
FIRMRATIOit
SIZEij̄ t
MBij̄ t
EMPLOYEEij̄ t
OCFij̄ t
LEVij̄ t
LOSSij̄ t
OWNij̄ t
BODij̄ t
INVRECij̄ t
PCRATIOit
CCRATIOit
FIRMRATIOit

-0.490***
-0.122
0.338***
0.003
0.002
-0.305***
-0.095
-0.063
-0.265***
0.061
0.006
-0.164*
0.004
-0.028
0.027
-0.130
0.055
-0.015
-0.088
-0.051
0.029
-0.056
0.405***
IMPORTANCEij̄ t
-0.242**
0.151
-0.026
-0.015
-0.080
-0.056
-0.064
0.049
0.006
0.371***
0.274***
0.205**

EQDISPit
-0.085
-0.060
-0.179*
0.025
0.171*
-0.162*
0.006
0.427***
-0.388***
0.188*
-0.108
0.063
-0.109
-0.123
0.130
0.069
-0.161*
0.028
0.080
0.003
0.022
-0.195*
SIZEij̄ t
-0.368***
0.596***
0.436***
0.125
-0.332***
0.464***
-0.229**
-0.099
-0.108
0.091
-0.456***

EFFORTij̄ t

PEFFORTij̄ t

-0.429***
0.625***
-0.241**
-0.047
0.116
-0.007
-0.050
0.600***
-0.359***
0.295***
-0.201**
-0.001
0.126
0.372***
-0.184*
-0.190*
0.095
0.613***
-0.391***
-0.196*
0.144
0.413***
-0.280***
0.199**
-0.166*
0.123
0.040
-0.072
0.263***
0.200**
-0.189*
0.032
0.040
-0.164*
0.092
-0.016
0.148
0.188*
-0.045
-0.470***
0.589***
MBij̄ t
EMPLOYEEij̄ t
OCFij̄ t

-0.109
-0.531***
0.300***
0.271***
-0.373***
0.450***
0.339***
-0.048
-0.078
0.059

0.391***
0.084
-0.322***
0.332***
-0.077
0.005
-0.132
0.005
-0.288***

FEEij̄ t

NASij̄ t

NEWij̄ t

BIGit

0.057
-0.131
0.508***
0.229**
-0.079
0.425***
-0.092
0.458***
0.087
0.553***
0.031
0.219**
0.024
0.051
0.116
0.088
-0.230**
-0.049
-0.365***
LEVij̄ t

-0.255***
0.124
-0.065
0.041
-0.016
0.100
-0.100
0.184*
-0.046
0.086
-0.064
0.016
0.156*
-0.007
-0.031
-0.072
-0.032
-0.086
LOSSij̄ t

-0.053
-0.137
0.173*
-0.213**
0.137
-0.170*
0.038
-0.182*
-0.136
0.131
0.073
-0.166*
0.138
-0.219**
0.276***
0.264***
-0.089
OWNij̄ t

0.242**
-0.081
0.514***
-0.291***
0.541***
-0.072
0.330***
0.097
0.099
-0.066
0.132
0.018
-0.053
-0.042
0.220**
-0.420***
BODij̄ t

-0.265***
-0.626***
0.622***
-0.393***
-0.381***
0.041
0.083
-0.134

0.241**
-0.201**
0.176*
0.254***
-0.252***
-0.192*
-0.134

-0.589***
0.252***
0.056
-0.062
-0.106
0.134

-0.490***
-0.211**
-0.054
0.001
-0.101

0.100
-0.033
-0.024
-0.101

AFFILIATEit

0.052
0.441***
-0.354***
0.203**
-0.010
0.135
-0.015
0.066
0.036
-0.040
0.004
-0.021
-0.104
0.032
-0.439***
INVRECij̄ t

-0.105
-0.126
0.132

OFFICEit

-0.060
-0.176*
-0.111
-0.036
-0.181*
-0.070
0.097
0.222**
-0.097
0.045
-0.040
0.002
-0.003
-0.082
PCRATIOit

0.946***
0.083

EXPERIENCEit

-0.419***
0.332***
0.059
0.263***
0.037
0.081
-0.011
0.042
0.078
0.024
-0.152*
-0.007
-0.281***
CCRATIOit

-0.350***

This table summarizes correlation coefficients of variables. Correlation coefficients are estimated at audit-firm level, where engagement-level variables are averaged per audit firm weighted by the number of public engagements conducted by the
respective firm in each fiscal year; Client-specific variables are averages of audit firm i’s manufacturing clients (j̄) listed in Korea Exchange (KRX) in fiscal year t. See Appendix 3.A for variable definitions.

116

Unlike Fama and Jensen (1983)’s prediction that larger and more complex partnership
demands greater managerial delegation for efficient operations, proxies of audit firm size,
BIGit, and AFFILIATEit, are not significantly correlated with CONWEDGEit.
Multivariate Analyses
In Table 3.4, we report the results of model (2). Results in the first panel is based
on the full sample while the results in the second panel are based on observations where
the auditor was not assigned to the client by the regulator (free market sample). The
reported coefficients are weighted three-stage least square estimates to control for the
correlation in the residuals in the model. We find that the coefficient on EQDISPit is
positive and significant for both dependent variables (EFFORTijt and PEFFORTijt),
indicating that the disparity in equity holdings of partners is associated with greater effort
in average audit production and greater partner involvement. These findings are consistent
with H1b. The effect of disparity in partner equity holdings on partner effort appears to be
economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in EQDISP from the sample
mean will increase average partner involvement in audit engagements by about 1.14
percent or about 5 percent of the mean value of PEFFORT.
We also report positive and significant coefficient on CONWEDGEit implying that
firms with greater delegation of control exhibit greater partner involvement in average
audit production. This suggests that the extent of managerial delegation is associated with
partner resource specialization, i.e., the delegation of control by non-managing partners to
managing partners enables the former to focus on developing competencies in
specialization. This finding is consistent with H2a.
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Table 3.4 Delegation of Control, Equity Disparity and Audit Production
(1) All-sample
EFFORTijt
EQDISPit
CONWEDGEit

0.115**
(2.20)
0.054***
(2.72)

EFFORTijt
FIRMRATIOit
PCRATIOit
CCRATIOit
FEEijt
NASijt
NEWijt
BIGit
AFFILIATEit
OFFICEit
EXPERIENCEit
IMPORTANCEjt
SIZEjt
MBjt
EMPLOYEEjt
OCFjt

0.130***
(4.00)
0.526***
(41.30)
0.003***
(2.99)
0.078***
(5.75)
0.087**
(2.46)
0.009
(0.58)
0.010***
(3.02)
0.000
(0.72)
-19.791**
(-2.45)
0.135***
(22.91)
-0.002
(-0.81)
0.036***
(7.46)
-0.192***
(-3.21)

(2) Free market only

PEFFORTijt
0.074***
(3.16)
0.039***
(4.18)
-0.339***
(-3.71)
0.289***
(17.03)
0.208***
(5.23)

0.182***
(3.77)
0.001***
(2.79)
0.026***
(3.07)
0.015
(0.71)
0.004
(0.67)
0.005***
(3.49)
0.000
(1.64)
-14.441***
(-4.01)
0.045***
(3.59)
0.001
(0.73)
0.009**
(2.29)
-0.067**
(-2.38)
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EFFORTijt

PEFFORTijt

0.127**
(2.25)
0.048**
(2.34)

0.068***
(2.76)
0.036***
(3.96)
-0.309***
(-3.33)
0.289***
(16.47)
0.194***
(4.75)

0.132***
(4.01)
0.524***
(38.85)
0.004***
(3.32)
0.089***
(5.82)
0.086**
(2.38)
0.002
(0.12)
0.009***
(2.58)
0.001
(1.53)
-22.585***
(-2.71)
0.135***
(21.70)
-0.000
(-0.14)
0.035***
(7.05)
-0.148**
(-2.23)

0.167***
(3.40)
0.001**
(2.40)
0.029***
(2.98)
0.009
(0.42)
0.003
(0.57)
0.005***
(2.93)
0.000*
(1.94)
-14.147***
(-3.78)
0.041***
(3.23)
0.002*
(1.89)
0.007*
(1.94)
-0.037
(-1.36)

LEVjt
LOSSjt
OWNjt
BODjt
INVRECjt
constant

0.131***
(5.09)
0.004
(0.35)
-0.001***
(-3.13)
0.007*
(1.83)
-0.043
(-1.34)
-2.004***
(-19.63)

0.036**
(2.37)
0.005
(1.13)
-0.000***
(-2.59)
0.004***
(2.91)
0.003
(0.26)
-0.647***
(-3.48)

0.140***
(4.95)
0.014
(1.08)
-0.001***
(-3.59)
0.004
(1.06)
-0.022
(-0.64)
-1.978***
(-18.30)

0.032**
(1.98)
0.010**
(2.00)
-0.000**
(-2.24)
0.003*
(1.89)
0.014
(1.10)
-0.593***
(-3.19)

nit

168

168

njt

3118

2790

This table presents weighted least-squares estimates describing the average audit-firm engagement resource
allocations in audit production. As weights, we use the number of observations per audit firm per fiscal year
in the sample, because the error variances in the average engagement resource allocations are larger the fewer
engagement observations to estimate for the audit-firm average resource allocation decisions after controlling
for client risk characteristics. Systems of equations are estimated for associations between audit-firm’s
delegation of control and equity disparity on average resource allocation in audit productions. Delegation of
control is proxied with CONWEDGEit, the percentage partner-ownership holdings by non-managing partners
of audit firm i in fiscal year t. Equity disparity is proxied with EQDISPit, the range of equity holding of audit
firm i in fiscal year t. Average audit-firm engagement resource allocations are measured in both quantity and
quality, with a natural log of total audit hours spent by engagement auditors from audit firm i for client j in
year t (EFFORTijt) and partner involvement as engagement hours spent by the lead partner divided by hour
spent by all participating auditors from audit firm i for client j in year t (PEEFORTjt). Free market sample
consists of engagement observations where the auditor was not assigned to the client by the regulator. *, **,
*** denote two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, and numbers in parentheses
are test statistics. See Appendix 3.A. for definitions of all variables.

Also, consistent with H2b, we find a positive significant coefficient on CONWEDGEit
when the dependent variable is EFFORTijt.
Following the findings in Bae et al. (2016) that industry specialist auditors exert
greater audit effort than non-industry specialist auditors, we interpret our result as
additional evidence of managerial delegation associated with resource specialization
within the firm. In terms economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in
CONWEDGE from the sample mean will increase average partner involvement in audit
engagements by about 1.71 percent or about 8.38 percent of the mean value of PEFFORT.
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Turning to the control variables, we find that availability of audit-firm’s human
capital (CCRATIO, PCARATIO, and EMPLOYEE), audit-firm size (BIG and OFFICE) are
positively associated with greater partner involvement or greater effort in average audit
production. We also find that several characteristics of the audit client, such as NEW, SIZE,
LEV, and BOD are positively associated with greater partner involvement or greater effort
in average audit production. Inconsistent with our expectation, the coefficient on
IMPORTANCE is negative, suggesting that audit effort is decreasing in client importance.
However, the coefficient on FEE is positive and significant across all columns, indicating
that audit hours and partner hours are increasing for clients paying higher audit fees.
In Korea, the regulator (FSS) designates an auditor for some companies, such as
those involved in IPO or with impaired capital. Since clients lack bargaining power over
fees in designated engagements, in addition to elevated risk level, audit production
decisions for designated engagements would differ from free-market engagements.
Therefore, we exclude 328 engagement observations with impaired capital or IPO status
and re-estimate the weighted 3SLS coefficients and those results are in the second panel of
Table 3.4. Our findings are similar to those in the first panel based on the full sample.
Additional Analyses
Delegation of Control and Misalignment in Decision Horizon
To further investigate the effect of incentive misalignment between managing and
non-managing partners of audit firm on average resource allocation in audit production,
we focus on partner tenure in the firm. Type I agency conflict between managing and nonmanaging partners would be more evident when incentives of the two groups are
misaligned. Literature on corporate CEO and firm performance suggests that shorter
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decision horizon of CEO is associated with greater agency cost and older CEOs tend to
make less investment than younger CEOs (Antia et al. 2010; Serfling 2014). We are not
able to observe partner age, but we infer partners’ decision horizon based on their tenure at
the firm; longer tenure generally suggests older partners who are closer to their retirement
and possibly more risk averse. We estimate average tenure of managing and non-managing
partners and compute the difference between the two groups to gauge incentive
misalignment associated with the delegation of control. We believe that older managing
partners would have shorter decision horizon as they are closer to retirement. Older
partners would be more cost sensitive, while junior partners with longer decision horizon
would be more willing to invest in audit production to build reputation capital. We generate
a dichotomous variable, OLDERit, denoting whether the average tenure of managing
partner(s) is greater than that of non-managing partners and test whether findings are robust
to controlling for the misalignment in decision horizon. Of 168 firm-year observations, for
104 firm-year observations, the average tenure of managing partners is greater than that of
non-managing partners by 12 months. The Pearson correlation coefficient between
CONWEDGEit and OLDERit is 0.067 (p-value = 0.32), indicating that the variable is not
associated with the extent of managerial delegation. We expect the coefficient on OLDERit
to be negatively associated with total efforts used (EFFORTij̄ t) and partner involvement in
audit production (PEFFORTij̄ t), consistent with the notion that the management would be
more cost-sensitive and less interested in reputation building over a long term. We reestimate weighted 3SLS model with variable OLDERit and find that the coefficients on
CONWEDGEit and EQDISPit continue to be positive and significant, after controlling for
OLDERit (results not tabulated). We also find a negative and significant coefficient on
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OLDERit when the dependent variable is EFFORTij̄ t, suggesting that shorter decision
horizon of managing partners is negatively associated with average auditor resource
allocation to engagements.
Informativeness of Transparency Reports to Audit Clients
Public audit is an intangible service and clients, and users of financial statements
may have difficulty in assessing the quality of service they receive. Extant studies
document that partnerships incentivize auditors to develop brand reputation through
efficient management of human capital and the benefits from risk-sharing outweigh the
internal agency costs associated with partnerships (Fama and Jensen 1983; Balachandran
and Ramakrishnan 1987; Lent 1999). Studies also suggest that partnership may be the
optimal organizational form in public accounting because the professional partnership
minimizes contracting costs between the client and the auditor where clients of public audit
have difficulty in fully observing and assessing the quality of the service (Podolny 1993).
While we have examined how audit-firm governance characteristics are associated with
average resource allocation in audit productions of the firm, it is also an empirical question
whether the market values the usefulness of audit-firm governance characteristics
information in the transparency reports. We examine whether the information in auditor
transparency reports serves as signals of audit firm’s reputation and audit quality, by
examining whether CONWEDGEit and EQDISPit are associated with client retention and
recruitment.
To measure client retention, we collect the number of clients by the number of years
of their relationship with the audit firm. Then, we estimate the percentage of current-year
clients retained as continuing clients in the next year. We perform audit-firm level analyses
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on retention of public audit clients (RET_PUBLICit), statutory audit clients
(RET_STATUTORYit), and voluntary audit clients (RET_VOLUNTARYit) using the model
below62:
RET_TYPEit = β1(CONWEDGEit) + β2(EQDISPit) + ΣControls + ε

(4)

TYPE = {PUBLIC, STATUTORY, VOLUNTARY}
where subscripts i and t denote audit firm and fiscal year respectively. Depending on the
type of client retention we investigate, we limit the sample of audit firm-year observations
to those with at least one audit client of the type in current year t; if a firm has zero public
audit client in year t, we do not include the audit firm observation in the retention analysis.
As a result, we have 218, 238, and 308, representing public, statutory, and voluntary audit
firm-year observations, respectively, for retention analyses. Out of the 220 audit-firm-year
observations with at least one public audit engagement production, two audit firms are
acquired after the sample period and client retention analysis is not applicable for these two
observations. The results of model (4) are summarized in Panel A, Table 3.5. The estimated
coefficients on CONWEDGEit and EQDISPit are positive and significant at the 0.05 level
for retaining both public and statutory audit clients. While
the coefficient on EQDISP is positively associated with retention of private (voluntary
audit) clients, the coefficient on CONWEDGEit is insignificant.

Statutory audit not only includes audits of public companies, but also audits of large private companies
that exceed the minimum threshold for mandatory audit. Private companies with revenue or total assets
greater than 50 billion KRW (≈ $50 million) were required to have their financial statements audited by
external auditor. From 2020, all companies including limited liability companies are required to have their
financial statements audited by external auditor if they do not meet at least three criteria to satisfy the
requirements of ‘small company’ in Korea.
62
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Table 3.5 Delegation of Control, Equity Disparity on Client Retention and Recruitment
Panel A Delegation of Control, Equity Disparity and Client Retention

EQDISPit

(1)

(2)

(3)

RET_PUBLICit

RET_STATUTORYit

RET_VOLUNTARYit

0.220**

0.224**

(2.61)
CONWEDGEit
BIGit
AFFILIATEit
REV_AUDITit

(2.35)

0.089**

0.104**

LEVit

(2.75)
0.016

(2.11)

(2.21)

(0.49)

-0.106**

-0.084**

-0.088**

(-3.01)

(-2.13)

-0.029

-0.024

(-1.02)

(-0.77)

0.005***

0.005***

(3.82)
SIZEit

0.130**

(3.78)

0.045***

0.041***

(7.97)

(6.47)

-0.213**

-0.184*

(-3.15)
-0.110***
(-5.73)
0.002**
(2.40)
0.051***
(15.04)
-0.022

(-2.18)

(-1.71)

-0.008

-0.007

(-1.26)

(-1.01)

(-5.36)

-0.035

0.012

(-1.79)

(-1.45)

(0.75)

nit

218

238

307

adj. R2

0.963

0.950

0.971

OFFICEit
FY2016t

-0.039*
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(-0.37)
-0.019***

Panel B Delegation of Control, Equity Disparity and Client Recruitment

EQDISPit
CONWEDGEit
PUBLICLOSSit+1

(1)

(2)

(3)

NEW_PUBLICit+1
-1.778***
(-7.84)
-0.147
(-1.08)
0.007***
(3.89)

NEW_STATUTORYit+1
-1.840***
(-8.60)
-0.067
(-0.53)

NEW_VOLUNTARYit+1
-0.825***
(-15.84)
0.088**
(2.27)

STATULOSSit+1

0.007***
(4.09)

VOLUNLOSSit+1
BIGit
AFFILIATEit
REV_AUDITit
SIZEit
LEVit
OFFICEit
FY2016t

nit

3.000***
(24.97)
1.132***
(13.19)
0.034***
(11.97)
-0.088***
(-5.63)
0.462*
(1.74)
0.218***
(15.67)
-19.213***

3.021***
(27.63)
1.063***
(13.50)
0.032***
(11.68)
-0.075***
(-5.21)
0.527**
(2.16)
0.219***
(17.16)
-18.569***

-0.003***
(-3.43)
0.328***
(5.74)
0.556***
(25.78)
0.008***
(9.74)
0.154***
(40.83)
1.214***
(18.31)
0.117***
(35.06)
-9.420***

(-17.81)

(-18.87)

(-37.10)

307

307

307

Panel A presents weighted OLS estimates describing the client retention rate. As weights, we use the number
of existing clients per audit firm per fiscal year for retention models, because the error variances in the
estimation of retention rate are larger the fewer clients to observe and estimate for the likelihood to stay with
current auditor. Panel B presents Poisson regression estimates describing the number of new audit clients.
Delegation of control is proxied with WEDGEit, the percentage partner-ownership holdings by non-managing
partners of audit firm i in fiscal year t, and equity disparity is proxied with EQDISPit, the range of equity
holding of audit firm i in fiscal year t. See Appendix 3.A. for definitions of all variables. *, **, *** denote
two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, and numbers in parentheses are test
statistics.
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To examine whether audit-firm governance characteristics are associated with new
clients, we model below the number of new clients (NEW_Yit+1), assuming Poisson
distribution:
PO (NEW_TYPEit) = β1(CONWEDGEit) + β2(EQDISPit) + ΣControls + ε

(5)

NEW_TYPE = { NEW_PUBLIC, NEW_STATUTORY, NEW_VOLUNTARY}
where subscripts i and t denote audit firm and fiscal year, respectively. We use 307 audit
firm-year observations to examine whether the test variables are significantly associated
with the ability to recruit new audit clients. Results are summarized in Panel B. Not all
audit firms are able to recruit new audit clients every year due to auditors’ resource capacity.
Of the 307 sample audit-firm-year observations, 162 observations have zero first-year
public audit clients, and 9 observations have zero first-year audit clients. After controlling
for the number of lost clients, we find no evidence that CONWEDGEit is significantly
associated with recruitment of public or statutory audit clients, but we find a positive and
significant association between the managerial delegation and the number of first-year
voluntary audit clients. We find a significant negative coefficient on EQDISPit in all three
columns, suggesting that disparity in ownership has an adverse effect on attracting new
clients.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though regulators have recognized the relation between governance and
supervision in public accounting firms and audit outcomes, there is a paucity of empirical
evidence on this important issue. We focus on South Korea where audit firm transparency
report is mandated and examine the links between features of audit-firm governance and
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audit production. We find that audit-firms’ delegation of control by non-managing partners
to managing partners and equity disparity in firm ownership are positively associated with
greater resource allocations in audit production, measured by total audit hours spent, and
the weight of partner hours in total audit hours. We also find that the positive association
between the delegation of control and partner involvement in audit production is attenuated
when the incentive conflict between the managerial and non-managerial partner groups is
evident. Finally, we find that audit firms’ delegation of control and disparity in ownership
holdings are positively associated with client retention but ownership disparity is
negatively associated with client recruitment.
While we rely on disclosures from public accounting firms in South Korea to
measure audit-firm governance attributes, we acknowledge some challenges in measuring
audit-firm governance. Some audit partners take their money invested in equity back as
company loans to employees, and in this case, equity-holding based measures of wedge
and disparity may not reflect the actual stake holdings of partners in the firm. Also, some
senior managers are promoted without equity buy-in, but rather with a purchase of firmissued bonds. Names of those ‘liability partners’ are not disclosed in the annual reports and
creates a potential measurement error. Future research can examine whether and how those
liability partners influence the governance effects on firm-specific characteristics in audit
production. Also, future research can examine the role of audit-firm governance attributes
on audit quality.
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Appendix 3.A Variable Definitions
Test variables
CONWEDGEit

EQDISPit

Dependent variables
EFFORTijt
PEFFORTijt

NEW_PUBLICit
NEW_STATUTORYit
NEW_VOLUNTARYit
RET_PUBLICit
RET_STATUTORYit
RET_VOLUNTARYit
Other variables
AFFILIATEit
BIGit
BODjt
CCRATIOjt
CLIENTSit
EMPLOYEEjt
EXPERIENCEit
FEEijt
FIRMRATIOit
IMPORTANCEijt

Control-ownership wedge measured as the percentage of ownership held
by non-managing partners in audit firm i in year t. Higher values indicate
greater delegation of control.
Equity ownership disparity calculated as the difference between
maximum and minimum partner equity holding of audit firm i in year t.
Higher values indicate greater disparity in ownership.
The natural log transformation of total CPA hours spent by audit firm i on
engagement j in year t.
Engagement partner involvement in audit production as the number of
audit hours spent by engagement partner of audit firm i divided by total
CPA hours spent on engagement j in year t.
The number of new public audit clients recruited in year t +1.
The number of new statutory audit clients recruited in year t +1.
The number of new private (voluntary) audit clients recruited in year t +1.
The percentage of current-year public audit clients retained in year t +1.
The percentage of current-year statutory audit clients retained in year t +1.
The percentage of current-year private (voluntary) audit clients retained
in year t +1.
Equals 1 if audit firm i is a member of global accounting firm network, 0
otherwise.
Equals 1 if audit firm i is one of PwC, KPMG, EY, or Deloitte, 0
otherwise.
The number of directors in the board of directors for client-firm j in fiscal
year t.
The number of CPAs divided by the number of all audit clients of audit
firm i in year t.
The number of all audit engagements (both public and private) conducted
by audit firm i in year t.
The squared root of the total number of employees of client-firm j in fiscal
year t.
The number of years of institutional audit experience measured as firm
age of audit firm i in year t.
The natural log transformation of total audit fee paid to auditor i in 1,000
KRW (≈ $1) for engagement j in year t.
The number of equity partners divided by the number of CPAs at audit
firm i in year t.
Audit fees from the engagement j divided by total audit revenue earned
by audit firm i for the fiscal year t.
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INVRECjt
LEVjt (or it)
LOSSjt
MBjt
NASjt
NEWjt
OANCFjt
OCFjt
OFFICEit
OLDERit
OWNjt
PCRATIOjt
PUBLICit

PUBLICLOSSit+1
SIZEjt (or it)

STATULOSSit+1
VOLUNLOSSit+1

Inventory and account receivables deflated by total assets of client j in
fiscal year t.
Total liability divided by total assets of client j (or audit firm i) in fiscal
year t.
Equals 1 if net loss is reported, for client j in fiscal year t, 0 otherwise.
Market to book ratio as market capitalization divided by book value of
equity of client j in fiscal year t.
The natural log transformation of total non-audit service expenses from
client j paid to any public accounting firm in fiscal year t.
Equals 1 if engagement j is first year auditing the client in year t, 0
otherwise.
Operating cash flows in million KRW (≈ $1k).
OANCFjt divided by total assets of client j in fiscal year t.
The number of audit offices, including the number of satellite office(s), of
audit firm i in year t.
Equals 1 average tenure of managing partners is at least 12-month greater
than that of non-managing partners of audit firm i in year t.
The percentage equity ownership held by the largest shareholder for client
j in fiscal year t.
The number of equity partners divided by the number of all audit clients
of audit firm i in year t.
The number of public audit engagements conducted by audit firm i in year
t in the sample.
The number of prior-period public audit clients of audit firm i in year t
lost in year t+1.
Log transformation of total assets in 1,000 KRW (≈ $1) of client j (or audit
firm i) in fiscal year t.
The number of prior-period statutory audit clients of audit firm i in year t
lost in year t+1.
The number of prior-period voluntary audit clients of audit firm i in year
t lost in year t+1.
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